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I. INTRODUCTION
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, it
triggered a panic in financial markets that threatened catastrophic
harm to the real economy.1 Regulators, who had already worked to
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1. See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 340–42 (Official Government ed. 2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]
(describing in general terms the aftermath of Lehman’s failure).
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prevent the default of major financial firms,2 redoubled their efforts,
putting taxpayer money at risk as they recapitalized large financial
firms and guaranteed their liabilities in order to prevent further
failures.3
These events served to illustrate a classic dilemma regulators too
often face when a large financial firm totters: allow the firm to fail and
risk panic and catastrophic contagion, or bail it out, putting taxpayers
at risk and exacerbating “moral hazard.”4 Firms whose imminent fail-
ure would force regulators to make this type of choice are “too big to
fail.”5 One of the central themes of post-crisis reforms has been tack-
ling the too-big-to-fail problem by trying to ensure that systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) can fail while neither sparking
a broader panic nor requiring taxpayers to cover losses for the SIFIs’
creditors.6 Solving this problem is vital, as the essential conditions
that could spark a financial crisis and SIFI failures persist.7
2. By the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy, regulators had intervened directly to pre-
vent the failure of Bear Stearns and of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Id. at
280–91, 309–23. The Federal Reserve had also already established several emer-
gency lending facilities for broker-dealers such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley. See, e.g., DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL: A
GUIDE TO THE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND CONTRACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
(2009) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL].
3. FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 2, at 18–104, 116–43 (describing the
bailout of insurance giant AIG, and capital injections and liability guarantee pro-
grams for banks and BHCs).
4. Moral hazard refers to the phenomenon of people taking less care to avoid bad
outcomes when they are protected from bearing the full cost of those outcomes.
See, e.g., TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES
9 (2014).
5. “Too big to fail” should be understood as describing a firm’s “systemic footprint,”
not just its size. See Jeremy C. Stein, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., Regulating Financial Institutions, Remarks at “Rethinking Macro
Policy II,” a conference sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (April 17,
2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein20130417a.htm
[https://perma.unl.edu/Q379-FYRW] (“To be clear, I am using the word ‘size’ as
shorthand for the broader concept of an institution’s systemic footprint, which in
addition to size, might reflect complexity, interconnectedness, and global span of
operations.”).
6. See, e.g., John Crawford, “Single Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the
Latest Cure for Bailouts, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 103 (2014).
7. The essence of a financial crisis is the widespread withdrawal of short-term fund-
ing—that is, widespread runs or a panic. See Timothy F. Geithner, Are We Safe
Yet: How to Manage Financial Crises, 96 FOREIGN AFF. 54 (2017), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-12-12/are-we-safe-yet [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/J46S-EQTK] (“It’s important to understand why financial sys-
tems are so vulnerable to crises. First, and most important, they are inherently
prone to panics and runs.”); John H. Cochrane, Lessons from the Financial Crisis,
REGULATION Winter 2009–10, at 34 (“The signature event of [the] financial crisis
[of 2008] was the ‘run,’ ‘panic,’ ‘flight to quality,’ or whatever you choose to call
it . . . . If that panic had not occurred, it is likely that any economic contraction
following the housing bust would have been no worse than the mild 2001 reces-
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Scholars and regulators have made significant progress in navigat-
ing a path between the twin dangers of bailout and contagion once a
decision is made to place a SIFI into either bankruptcy or resolution,
the two special legal processes for dealing with failed financial firms.8
(Unless otherwise specified, I will use “resolution” in this Article to
refer to either legal process.)9 There is, however, a significant linger-
ing weakness both in the legal scholarship and in the on-the-ground
reforms: the lack of appropriate guidelines informing the decision to
trigger the resolution process in the first place. The weakness is sig-
nificant, as failure to get the trigger right could exacerbate crisis dy-
namics and undo much of the work regulators have done to address
the too-big-to-fail problem.10 This Article addresses this weakness,
identifying significant obstacles to an optimal triggering framework in
the current regulatory landscape and proposing reforms to help
achieve such a framework going forward.
Two overlapping challenges confront regulators in designing an op-
timal triggering framework: choosing the correct triggering metric
and ensuring the timeliness of the decision to pull the trigger. The
principal options for triggering resolution are (i) “balance sheet” insol-
vency, when the value of a firm’s assets falls below its liabilities; and
(ii) illiquidity, when a firm runs out of cash and easily saleable as-
sets.11 I argue below that while either option is appropriate for nonfi-
nancial firms, balance sheet insolvency is the appropriate trigger for
financial institutions.12 Using liquidity as a trigger risks needlessly
shutting down a viable financial institution.13 More importantly, it
sion that followed the dot-com bust.”). There are still trillions of dollars of unin-
sured short-term debt claims in the U.S. financial system. See, e.g., THE VOLCKER
ALL., UNFINISHED BUSINESS: BANKING IN THE SHADOWS 14 fig.1 (2016) (measuring
uninsured short-term debt in the financial system). A large portion of these are
issued by SIFIs. See, e.g., infra note 36 and accompanying text.
8. See infra section II.C.
9. As noted below, there are reasons to believe that bankruptcy is an inferior option
for large financial institutions compared to a regulator-run resolution process.
See infra section II.C.; see also infra notes 171–179 and accompanying text. Be-
cause the trigger issues are for the most part common to the two legal processes,
however, I avoid wading too deeply into this debate.
10. See infra section III.A.
11. See infra section II.B. Illiquidity is sometimes referred to as “cash flow insol-
vency,” but in this Article, I use insolvency to refer exclusively to “balance sheet”
insolvency. As explained below, it is possible for a solvent firm to run out of cash
and for an insolvent firm not to run out of cash for a considerable period of time.
Infra section II.B.
12. See infra Part III.
13. The Federal Reserve’s creation depended in large part on this insight: solvent
banks sometimes run out of cash, and it is better to provide liquidity support (i.e.,
loans) to these banks than it is to force them to default. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks,
Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 75, 117 (2012)
([“The Federal Reserve Act] established a quasi-public central bank and author-
ized it to supply liquidity to the banking system in times of stress.”). For a com-
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creates perverse incentives on the part of firms trying to avoid resolu-
tion—prompting them to hoard liquidity at the very moment the mar-
ket most needs these institutions to use their cash to lend to and buy
from others.14 This problem has particular salience because the Fed-
eral Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
under current guidance for the mandatory SIFI pre-bankruptcy plans
popularly known as “living wills,” have pushed SIFIs to include a li-
quidity tripwire for a bankruptcy filing.15
Even if one uses a solvency-based trigger, however, timeliness re-
mains a challenge due to biases on the part of private actors and regu-
lators to delay pulling the trigger, and to the fact that regulatory
measures of capital often lag real economic developments.16 There is
nothing in the principal SIFI resolution mechanism established by the
Dodd-Frank Act, titled the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), that
mitigates or counteracts these factors. This is a problem because wait-
ing too long to pull the trigger could undermine the work done to elim-
inate the too-big-to-fail dilemma. A key element of the “solution” to the
too-big-to-fail problem is ensuring that SIFIs have sufficient loss-bear-
ing capacity—essentially, claims on the firm that do not pose a “run”
risk,17 as deposits do—to absorb all the SIFI’s losses, but delay allows
losses to metastasize. If losses grow large enough, they may require
regulators again to decide whether to engage in a bailout or to impose
losses on deposit-like creditors, which could spark a panic.18
This Article’s analysis yields several important policy implications.
First, liquidity—the cash or easily saleable assets a firm holds—
should not be used as a trigger for placing a SIFI into bankruptcy or
resolution.19 A second implication follows from the first: as long as we
tolerate vast amounts of uninsured short-term debt funding for nonde-
pository institutions,20 post-crisis restrictions on emergency lending
to SIFIs by the Federal Reserve should be relaxed.21 Third, it is im-
portant to establish clearer guidelines for triggering resolution pro-
ceedings at the right moment. A promising framework already exists;
it was set forth in an “early remediation” rule that was proposed in
2012 but never finalized.22 The trigger problem would be significantly
prehensive account of the functions of the Federal Reserve today (as well as the
legal and non-legal sources of authority for these functions), see PETER CONTI-
BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2016).
14. See infra section III.A.
15. See infra section III.A.
16. See infra subsection III.B.2.
17. See infra notes 29, 58–60 and accompanying text.
18. See infra section II.C.
19. See infra section IV.A.
20. The optimal approach would likely be not to tolerate this but there is, at present,
little political traction for such a change. See infra note 66.
21. See infra section IV.A.
22. See infra section IV.B.
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mitigated if this rule were finalized and implemented. Fourth, the use
of market measures of solvency should be explored.23 These measures,
which could be employed instead of or in addition to regulatory capital
measures, could potentially improve the timeliness of triggering deci-
sions. (The yet-to-be-finalized early remediation rule provides a mech-
anism for exploring the use of market measures in a cautious way.)
Finally, to the degree concerns about timeliness persist after other
steps have been implemented, regulators should consider increasing
the amount of “loss-absorbing” long-term debt SIFIs are required to
issue.24
Part II of this Article provides a brief account of background con-
cepts essential to the arguments of the piece. Part III lays out the gaps
and obstacles in the current regulatory landscape that impede the re-
alization of an optimal framework for triggering resolution. Part IV
proposes steps for achieving such a framework, and Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS
Understanding the arguments about resolution triggers requires a
baseline understanding of certain key institutions and concepts. This
Part briefly provides the necessary background, describing the key en-
tities at issue, the most prominent candidates for triggering metrics,
and different mechanisms for dealing with failed firms. Readers famil-
iar with this background material may wish to jump ahead to Part III.
A. Banks, Shadow Banks, and Bank Holding Companies
Banks. As used in this Article, a “bank” with no other qualifier, and
unless otherwise noted, is a generic term for depository institutions.
These include commercial banks, thrifts, and other legal entities that
may receive deposits and enjoy federal deposit insurance.25
Shadow Banks. “Shadow banking,” as used in this Article, refers to
non-banks—such as broker-dealers—that adopt a bank’s financing
model: namely, using money raised by issuing large quantities of
short-term debt to fund portfolios of long(er)-term financial assets.26
23. See infra section IV.B.
24. See infra section IV.C.
25. For a comprehensive account of legal entities that have been defined as “banks”
under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 1956, see Saule T. Omarova &
Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank
Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
113 (2011).
26. See MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION ix
(2017) (“[Shadow banking] has come to mean different things to different peo-
ple. . . . To [the Crisis Response Team at the U.S. Treasury] . . . the term meant
something . . . quite specific. When we talked about shadow banking, we were
referring to the financial sector’s use of vast amounts of short-term debt to fund
portfolios of financial assets.”).
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While non-banks are legally prohibited from issuing deposits,27 it
turns out that they can comply with the letter of this rule while violat-
ing its spirit by issuing the functional equivalent of deposits. These
deposit equivalents include instruments such as commercial paper or
“repo loans.”28 For the short-term debt claimant of a shadow bank, the
transaction serves as a close substitute for a bank deposit—that is, it
serves as a safe mechanism for storing cash until it is needed to meet
some transactional purpose.29 Just as a bank funds (long-term) mort-
gages or commercial loans with demand deposits that mature continu-
ously, a shadow bank may invest in long-term bonds with money
raised by the issuance of deposit equivalents such as repo. Both types
of funding models rely on the depositor’s or the short-term debt claim-
ant’s willingness to roll her loan over from day to day or (short-term)
period to period, and on other lenders readily stepping in to replace
withdrawn funding. As we will see, both funding models are also vul-
nerable to runs and panics in the absence of a safety net.30
Bank Holding Companies. Bank holding companies (BHCs) com-
prise a (non-bank) parent company with various subsidiaries, includ-
27. See Ricks, supra note 13, at 78–79 (describing the legal prohibition on non-banks
receiving deposits as the “first law of banking”).
28. “Repo” is short for “repurchase agreement,” in which a cash lender—the func-
tional equivalent of a depositor—makes a short-term collateralized loan to a fi-
nancial institution. TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN, THE SHADOW BANKING
SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION 8 (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y.,
Staff Report No. 382, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/
sr382.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/M8SU-K7ET] (“In a repo, the borrower sells a
security today for a price below the current market price on the understanding
that it will buy it back in the future at a pre-agreed price.”). A “commercial paper”
is “an unsecured, short-term debt instrument issued by a corporation.” Commer-
cial Paper, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commercialpa
per.asp [https://perma.unl.edu/AAB7-JCDR]. It is worth noting that commercial
paper issuers—that is, the borrower, in the position of the bank—are overwhelm-
ingly (nonbank) financial institutions, or shadow banks. RICKS, supra note 26, at
36.
29. See Ricks, supra note 13, at 91 (describing an “economic agent’s transaction re-
serve [as] the set of assets that the agent holds primarily to facilitate desired
exchanges”).
30. For example, the banking system in the United States was prone to periodic pan-
ics prior to the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in
1933. See, e.g., GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES 29 (2012)
(second alteration in original) (citing an 1899 claim that “[s]ince 1793 panics have
occurred [in the United States] in the following years: 1797, 1811, 1813, 1816,
1819, 1825, 1837, 1847, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1884, 1890, and 1893”); Ben Bernanke,
Origins and Mission of the Federal Reserve, in The Federal Reserve and the Fi-
nancial Crisis 9–10 (2013) (identifying six banking panics between 1873 and
1914). The financial crisis of 2008 is best understood as a panic in the shadow
banking system, which lacked automatic access to the federal safety net. See gen-
erally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007
(2010).
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ing both banks and non-banks.31 Figure 1, on the following page,
provides a stylized illustration of this structure. The largest financial
institutions in the United States, including firms such as JP Morgan,
Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley, are BHCs.32 These
large BHCs are sometimes referred to as “global systemically impor-
tant BHCs,” or GSIBs.33 GSIBs are the most salient institutions today
posing the too-big-to-fail dilemma, and they have been the focal point
of most thinking about resolution design. This Article’s analysis as-
sumes a GSIB structure for giant financial firms placed into
resolution.34
31. Under the original Bank Holding Company Act, the activities of bank affiliates—
in other words, of BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries—were tightly con-
stricted. See, e.g., RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTI-
TUTIONS 416 (5th ed. 2013). With the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999, BHCs that were adequately capitalized could elect to become financial
holding companies, and thus “engage in any activity . . . that the [Federal Re-
serve] Board . . . determines . . . to be financial in nature or incidental to such
financial activity; or is complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a
substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or the finan-
cial system generally.” 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k). Financial holding companies are a
subspecies of the BHC.
32. See, e.g., America’s Top 20 Bank Holding Companies, TKGI FIN., www.tkgi.net
[https://perma.unl.edu/88EF-QLUY]; Nat’l Info. Ctr., Holding Companies with
Assets Greater than $10 Billion, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, https://
www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/HCSGreaterThan10B.aspx [https://perma.unl.
edu/RKZ4-2LQT].
33. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, CALIBRATING THE GSIB
SURCHARGE, (2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/
gsib-methodology-paper-20150720.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/YX43-HXRK].
34. It is, of course, possible that non-GSIB financial firms will become systemically
important going forward. Indeed, until 2008, the paradigmatic Wall Street
“banks” were not BHCs but stand-alone investment banks—Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns. (In 2008,
all either converted to BHCs, were bought by BHCs, or failed. See FCIC REPORT,
supra note 1, at 280–91, 324–43, 353–86.) While this problem lies somewhat be-
yond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that the appropriate response to
this threat is for the Dodd-Frank-created Financial Stability Oversight Council to
designate any such firm as systemically important, which would subject the firm
to prudential regulation by the Federal Reserve, and for the Federal Reserve to
compel the firm to engage in the same sort of pre-failure structural adjustments
that have made orderly resolution for GSIBs plausible. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323.
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Figure 1: Illustrative GSIB Structure35
An important point about GSIBs is that even as they house giant
banks, they are also a locus of shadow-banking activity in their non-
bank subsidiaries. For example, the broker-dealer arms of the GSIBs
have continued to fund themselves with significant quantities of
short-term debt even after the crisis.36 While the bank subsidiaries of
a GSIB have automatic access to the safety net and a special resolu-
tion regime, the broker-dealer subsidiaries do not.37
B. Capital and Liquidity
Two essential concepts in understanding bank failure are capital
and liquidity. One justification for placing a firm into resolution or
bankruptcy proceedings might be that it owes more to creditors than
its assets are worth. To try to prevent this from happening, banks
must meet capital requirements. Capital requirements are exceed-
ingly complicated in their details,38 but conceptually straightforward:
they mandate that the value of a bank’s assets exceed the bank’s lia-
35. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp, Title II Resolution Strategy Overview 14 (Aug. 2012),
https://www.fdic.gov/resauthority/sifiresolution.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/KH6X
-CC84].
36. See, e.g., Eric S. Rosengren, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank
of Bos., Keynote Remarks at the Conference on the Risks of Wholesale Funding,
Fig. 8 (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.bostonfed.org/news-and-events/speeches/bro
ker-dealer-finance-and-financial-stability.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/MB4W-6G
7K] (showing the persistence of post-crisis broker-dealer reliance on short-term
funding sources such as repos and securities lending).
37. Regarding banks’ access to the safety net, see, for example, What’s Covered, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/covered/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
FC63-FGJK]; The Federal Reserve Discount Window, http://www.frbdiscountwin
dow.org/Pages/General-Information/The-Discount-Window.aspx [https://
perma.unl.edu/WB5Y-V8MU]. Regarding broker-dealers’ ineligibility for safety
net coverage, see, for example, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (2012) (prohibiting securities deal-
ers from engaging in the business of banking).
38. See 12 C.F.R. § 3.10 (2018).
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bilities by a minimum amount.39 (They have nothing to do with how
much cash a bank holds.)40 The thicker a bank’s capital buffer, the
more the bank can absorb losses in the value of its assets without in
turn defaulting on its own obligations. (I will return to capital regula-
tion in some detail below.)41
It is important to note that a bank can be insolvent—that is, it can
have negative capital because its liabilities exceed the value of its as-
sets—while remaining current on its obligations for a considerable pe-
riod of time.42 Banks are, however, also famously vulnerable to the
reverse problem: they may, under certain conditions, be unable to
meet their obligations—for example, honoring depositor withdrawal
requests—even if they are fundamentally solvent.43
This latter problem for banks arises because of a “liquidity” mis-
match between their assets and liabilities. An asset is “liquid” if it can
be sold quickly for full value. Cash is perfectly liquid; Treasuries and
publicly-traded shares are very liquid.44 An individual loan by a bank
to a customer or homeowner or small business, on the other hand,
tends to be illiquid—that is, it cannot be sold quickly for its full
value.45 Liquidity is important for a bank: if its depositors demand
39. See, e.g., CARNELL ET AL., supra note 31, at 217–18 (defining “capital” in the bank
regulatory context as distinct from other usages).
40. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Dis-
cussion of Capital Regulation 1 (Oct. 22, 2013) (unpublished article), https://
www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/fallacies-irrelevant-facts-
myths-discussion-capital-regulation-why [https://perma.unl.edu/7U83-EVF8] (ob-
serving that discussion of capital regulation is “often clouded by confusion be-
tween capital requirements and liquidity or reserve requirements”).
41. See infra section III.B.
42. As Douglas Shackelford and his co-authors observe, “even [a firm] that is un-
sound—if it can conceal its losses and keep on bringing in new investors—may
indefinitely postpone the day of reckoning. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securi-
ties LLC might be (seemingly) flourishing to this day if the financial crisis had
not triggered cash demands from its investors that exceeded its on-hand liquid
capital.” Douglas A. Shackelford et al., Taxation and the Financial Sector, in TAX-
ATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 148, 157–58 (S. Alworth & Giampolo Arachi eds.,
2012). The effect is, of course, even stronger at insured depositories, where most
depositors need not fear loss even in the event of bank failure.
43. See, e.g., id. (providing that “even a sound and well-managed firm may be subject
to a bank run”); see also Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs,
Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (modeling how a
run could occur even on solvent but illiquid banks).
44. Of course, every debt obligation is a liability for the borrower, but an asset for the
claimant. Demand deposits, the paradigmatic form of bank liability, constitute an
extremely liquid asset for the depositor.
45. John Crawford, Capital Accounts: Bank Capital, Crises, and the Determinants of
an Optimal Regulatory Approach, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1167 (2015) (“An asset
may be illiquid . . . because of the time it takes to sell it at full price; because of
the discount from full value one must accept in selling it; or both. The time lag
may be due to the difficulty of identifying a willing buyer or to the buyer’s need to
perform due diligence before closing the deal. Even with a willing buyer and time
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their principal back at unexpectedly high rates, a bank may run out of
cash and be forced to monetize other assets in order to meet redemp-
tion requests.46 If its assets are illiquid—as individual bank loans typ-
ically are—the bank may be forced either to halt redemptions (i.e.,
stop giving depositors their money back) or to sell assets at depressed
prices, both of which can have extremely pernicious knock-on ef-
fects.47 As a buffer against unexpectedly high rates of deposit with-
drawals, banks must hold some percentage of their deposit base “in
the form of vault cash or deposits with Federal Reserve Banks.”48
(These are reserve, not capital, requirements.) If withdrawals exceed
the buffer, banks can also seek loans from the Federal Reserve’s “dis-
count window.”49
Similar liquidity problems may afflict shadow banks, and it is
worth recalling that even as shadow banks may hold assets that ap-
for diligence, the seller may suffer a ‘lemons’ discount if the seller cannot credibly
communicate all the (good) information about the asset’s quality to the buyer.”).
46. In a famous scene in the movie It’s a Wonderful Life, George Bailey (played by
Jimmy Stewart) talks his bank customers out of running on the bank by explain-
ing that the bank’s assets were loans on their neighbor’s houses, which the bank
could not collect at a moment’s notice:
[Y]ou . . . you . . . you’re thinking of this place all wrong. As if I had the
money back in a safe. The, the money’s not here. Your money’s in Joe’s
house . . . right next to yours. And in the Kennedy house, and Mrs. Mack-
lin’s house, and, and a hundred others. Why, you’re lending them the
money to build, and then, they’re going to pay it back to you as best they
can. Now what are you going to do? Foreclose on them?
“It’s a Wonderful Life”, INTERNET MOVIE SCRIPT DATABASE, http://www.imsdb.
com/scripts/It’s-a-Wonderful-Life.html https://perma.unl.edu/7FWU-JBHX].
47. Halting redemptions can cause consequential losses for claimants, infra note 59,
as well as create contagious runs on sister banks, infra note 60. On the other
hand, engaging in asset sales at depressed prices can create extremely destruc-
tive negative externalities as other firms holding the same or similar assets have
to mark them down, weakening their capital position and—if the assets are being
used as collateral—forcing the firm to scramble to find other cash or securities as
collateral. See Anil K. Kashyap et al., Rethinking Capital Regulation in FED. RE-
SERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY, MAINTAINING STABILITY IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYS-
TEM 431, 440–41, (2008), https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/
sympos/2008/kashyaprajanstein031209.pdf?la=EN [https://perma.unl.edu/D3GK-
XNN7] (describing this dynamic as “the fire-sale externality”). These firms then
may be forced to liquidate assets at fire sale prices, leading to a vicious cycle. Id.
Further, as banks hoard liquidity in this type of environment, it may constrain
lending to new, creditworthy consumers and businesses, harming economic
growth. Id. at 442 (describing a “credit-crunch externality”).
48. Reserve REQUIREMENTS, Bd. Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., https://www.federalre
serve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/AH96-PD6A]
(last updated Nov. 3, 2017).
49. The discount window refers to the mechanism by which the Federal Reserve may
extend loans to depository institutions. See The Federal Reserve Discount Win-
dow, FED. RESERVE DISCOUNT WINDOW, https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/en/
Pages/General-Information/The-Discount-Window.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/
WB5Y-V8MU] (last updated June 6, 2015).
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pear more liquid than traditional bank assets do in normal times, a
key feature of financial crises is the desiccation of previously liquid
asset markets.50 Unlike banks, shadow banks lack automatic access
to lending by the Federal Reserve. However, the largest banks and
bank holding companies—which, recall, house much of the shadow
banking activity in our financial system51—face complex liquidity re-
quirements, which may be satisfied by cash or other instruments that
receive a regulatory imprimatur as liquid.52 Furthermore, the Federal
Reserve may lend to non-depositories in “unusual and exigent circum-
stances” under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.53 The Federal
Reserve used its authority under the provision to provide liquidity to
large broker dealers (operating as shadow banks) during the crisis in
2008.54 Concerns over moral hazard, however, prompted Congress in
the Dodd Frank Act to try to limit the authority so that it can be used
only to provide liquidity to the entire financial system—that is, as
part of programs with broad-based eligibility—rather than to prevent
the failure of specific institutions.55
C. Bankruptcy, Bank Resolution, and the Orderly
Liquidation Authority
Bankruptcy exists to prevent the destructive effects of “grab law”
that would ensue if creditors could enforce their contractual rights to
collect from an insolvent firm.56 The defining feature of bankruptcy is
50. See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 250–51 (describing the onset of the first
wave of the liquidity crisis in 2007, with BNP Paribas suspending redemptions at
three investment funds due to an inability to value assets arising from the “com-
plete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the U.S. securitiza-
tion market”).
51. See infra section II.A.
52. The principal liquidity requirement banks and BHCs must meet is a “liquidity
coverage ratio” (LCR). The LCR requires large banking organizations to “main-
tain an amount of high quality liquid assets . . . that is no less than 100 percent of
its total net cash outflows over a prospective 30 calendar-day period.” Liquidity
Coverage Ratio; Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 61440,
61443 (Oct. 10, 2014). For a description of assets that may count toward the
HQLA requirement, see Visual Memorandum, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, U.S.
Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio Final Rule, 37–43, (Sept. 23, 2014), http://
www.davispolk.com/files/9.23.14.US_.Basel_.3.LCR_.Final_.Rule_.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/TB2J-V8G8].
53. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2012).
54. See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 2, at 18–40.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(B)(i) (2012).
56. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 8–9 (1986)
(“Creditor remedies outside of bankruptcy . . . can be accurately described as a
species of ‘grab law,’ represented by the key characteristic of first-come, first-
served.”). As a stylized example, consider a firm that makes widgets. The firm
can sell the widgets for more than it costs to make them, but its profits are too
small to service pre-existing loans. (Imagine the firm took out the loans in an ill-
fated attempt to expand into the gadgets market.) The firm is insolvent, but by
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an automatic “stay” on all claims on the firm or the debtor’s estate in
order to preserve and maximize enterprise value and the aggregate
recovery to creditors, and to ensure that contractual priority among
creditors is honored.57
While bankruptcy can solve an important collective action problem
for most firms, its central tool—the stay—would be extremely destruc-
tive in the context of banks. (Indeed, banks cannot legally be put into
bankruptcy.)58 Bankruptcy inevitably creates a degree of delay and
uncertainty for creditors. The most important class of creditors for a
bank is, of course, its depositors. The mere whiff of any possible inter-
ference or delay in their ability to access their full principal is enough
to trigger a run—that is, the en masse withdrawal of deposits, with its
myriad destructive effects. These destructive effects may include the
suspension of deposit redemptions, which, while it may save the bank
as an institution, may impose costs on depositors that are much
higher than any ultimate investment losses.59 Even more problematic
is the contagion risk that can arise from suspending redemptions at
one bank: depositors at sister banks may fear a similar fate and decide
continuing to produce widgets, it ensures that creditors in aggregate will be able
to recover more. But each creditor will have an incentive to foreclose on the firm’s
assets to satisfy her claim, even if it means key equipment will no longer be avail-
able for widget production—thus halting the firm’s (profitable) operations and
lowering the aggregate amount available for recovery. If the creditor wins the
race, she may be paid in full, and others’ losses are of no concern to her. Even if a
particular creditor has altruistic impulses, holding back simply means someone
else will win the race and the overall result will be the same: production will
cease, and the pie will shrink. This can be modeled as a “prisoners dilemma” or a
“tragedy of the commons.” Id. at 10–14. This dynamic is what bankruptcy law
(successfully) aims to stop. Id.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). It is worth noting that the stay does not operate with
respect to certain financial contracts, typically called “qualified financial con-
tracts” (QFCs). See Charles W. Mooney Jr., The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors
for Settlement Payments and Securities Contracts: When is Safe Too Safe?, 49
TEX. INT’L L.J. 245, 246 n.2 (2014) (citing various provisions of the bankruptcy
code that operate as an exemption from the automatic stay for QFCs).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (2012) (specifically defining “debtor” for purposes of Chap-
ter 7 and Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code to exclude banks); id. §§ 301(a),
303(a) (limiting both voluntary and involuntary cases under the bankruptcy code
to “debtors”).
59. See Ricks, supra note 13, at 83 (explaining that because deposits and deposit
equivalents are held primarily to facilitate near-term transactions for their
claimants, their default—unlike the default on a long-term debt claim—can
“cause consequential losses to their holders—opportunity costs, operational dis-
ruption, reputational damage, or even default. Critically, these losses are distinct
from, and might far exceed, any investment losses that their holders
experience.”).
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to run as well.60 Widespread runs are incredibly damaging and consti-
tute the essence of a financial crisis.61
It is clear, then, that a different mechanism is called for in dealing
with faltering banks. In short, depositors need to feel confident that
they will experience neither loss nor delay in accessing their principal
in order to prevent a bank’s failure from triggering widespread runs.62
The “no loss” criterion is met by federal deposit insurance.63 The “no
delay” criterion is met by a special resolution process run by the FDIC.
A traditional FDIC bank resolution is extraordinarily quick: it is often
accomplished in a weekend, with depositors receiving immediate ac-
cess to their deposits.64 The FDIC has a great deal of discretion in
managing the resolution process,65 and it can pay off creditors and
make decisions about how to deal with the assets of a failed bank
without awaiting a judge’s decision.
Bank resolution prevents the problems that would ensue if banks
were put into bankruptcy. It does not, however, extend to shadow
banks. This creates difficulties because the inadequacy of bankruptcy
applies just as much to shadow banks as it does to banks: the risks of
contagion and the vicious knock-on effects exist with respect to de-
posit-like creditors just as they do with respect to depositors. The ma-
jor loci of shadow banking today are the GSIBs’ non-bank subsidiaries.
These subsidiaries, as well as the parent holding companies them-
selves, are not subject to bank resolution. The default method of deal-
ing with them if they fail is bankruptcy. This is a problem.66
60. See Hal S. Scott, Connectedness and Contagion: A Global Perspective, Address to
the International Monetary Fund 3 (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/
np/seminars/eng/2016/contagionrisk/110716.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/F2B9-
TYL8] (defining contagion as a situation in which “actual failure or fear of failure
of a financial institution causes short-term creditors-investors to withdraw and
withhold funding for financial institutions generally out of lack of information or
irrational panic”).
61. See, e.g., Geithner, supra note 7 (“It’s important to understand why financial sys-
tems are so vulnerable to crises. First, and most important, they are inherently
prone to panics and runs.”).
62. See Crawford, supra note 6, at 105.
63. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (2012). The FDIC is also empowered, with the consent of
the Treasury Secretary and two-thirds of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, to protect deposits above the insurance cap in the event it determines
that doing so is necessary to preserve the financial stability of the United States.
This is referred to as the “systemic risk” exception. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)
(2012).
64. See, e.g., CARNELL ET AL., supra note 31, at 502.
65. Id. at 501–08. It is important to note that unless the systemic risk exception is
invoked, supra note 63, the FDIC is constrained by “least cost resolution” require-
ments, which mandate the FDIC adopt a resolution strategy that leads to the
lowest direct cost to the deposit insurance fund. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2012).
66. There are compelling arguments that the optimal design of the financial system
would stamp out shadow banking entirely; if it did, then most of the challenge of
resolving large non-bank financial institutions would disappear. See generally
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Congress attempted to address this problem in the Dodd-Frank Act
with the creation of the OLA.67 The OLA confers authority on the
FDIC to resolve non-bank financial institutions whose failure would
threaten financial stability, and to do so outside of bankruptcy, upon
the recommendation and with the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury and the majority of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve.68 Invocation of the OLA requires, inter alia, a determination
by the Treasury Secretary that “the financial company is in default or
in danger of default”; that its failure and resolution outside the OLA
“would have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United
States”; and that “no viable private sector alternative is available to
prevent . . . default.”69
On its own, however, this new authority would be unlikely to pre-
vent contagious spillovers, for two reasons. First, the complexity of a
GSIB’s capital structure, organizational design, and web of
counterparty relationships is far greater than that of a traditional
bank, making it much harder for any resolution authority to meet the
“no delay” condition by making clean decisions in a short period of
time.70 Second, even if the FDIC could act with the requisite speed in
resolving a GSIB, it would lack credible authority to protect all the
non-deposit creditors whose claims serve as deposit substitutes; thus,
RICKS, supra note 26. While this is something to work toward in the longer term,
the near-term politics of such a move are likely intractable. See, e.g., Vı´tor Con-
staˆncio, Vice President, European Cent. Bank, Macroprudential Policy in a
Changing Financial System, Remarks at the Second ECB Macroprudential Policy
and Research Conference, (May 11, 2017), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/
date/2017/html/ecb.sp170511.en.html [https://perma.unl.edu/8MRG-TRSR] (con-
cluding that Ricks’s proposal to stamp out shadow banking seems “too complex to
be within the realm of practical possibility”).
67. 12 USC § 5384 (2012).
68. Id. § 5383. This is sometimes referred to as “three keys turning”—the Fed, the
FDIC, and the Secretary of the Treasury all have to agree. If the firm is a broker-
dealer, then the Securities and Exchange Commission acts “in consultation with
the Corporation.” Id. § 5383(a)(1)(B). If the firm is an insurance company, then
the Director of the Federal Insurance Office acts “in consultation with the Corpo-
ration.” Id. § 5383(a)(1)(C).
69. Id. § 5383(b).
70. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 125 (2011) (noting that in tradi-
tional bank resolutions the FDIC deals primarily with deposit liabilities); Ste-
phen J. Lubben, OLA After Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?, in AN
UNFINISHED MISSION: MAKING WALL STREET WORK FOR US 13 (Mike Konczal &
Marcus Stanley eds., 2013) (observing that the OLA on its own terms is ill-
equipped to deal with derivatives contracts); Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts In-
evitable?, 29 YALE J. REG. 121, 150 (2012) (noting that while “the FDIC has con-
siderable experience resolving community and medium-sized banks . . ., it has no
experience resolving a global SIFI. The business and balance sheets of global
SIFIs are very different from and more complex than those of community and
regional banks.”).
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it would fail to meet the “no loss” condition.71 Again, failing to meet
either condition could be enough to spark contagious runs—precisely
what special resolution authorities aim to prevent.
Regulators have come up with an ingenious two-pronged solution
to the problem.72 First, to address the challenge of speed, they have
proposed a strategy that focuses all resolution efforts at the holding
company level.73 Under this “single-point of entry” (SPOE) strategy,
all subsidiaries will be transferred to a new “bridge holding company”
and will, if all goes as planned, continue their operations without in-
terruption.74 No deposit-like claimants will experience delay in acces-
sing their principal. Second, to ensure that deposit-like creditors
receive their full principal, regulators have finalized a set of rules to
try to ensure the GSIB has issued enough equity and long-term debt—
in tandem, referred to as “total loss absorbing capacity” (TLAC)—at
the holding company level to absorb all BHC losses on an aggregate
basis.75 Because long-term debt claimants cannot effectively “run” by
demanding their money back in the near-term, and because they tend
to hold the claims as investments rather than as part of their transac-
tion reserve,76 imposing losses on this debt is unlikely to create the
same sort of systemic risks that imposing losses on short-term debt
does.77
To facilitate the SPOE strategy, the rules require not only that the
largest GSIBs issue large amounts of long-term debt at the holding
company level but also that they refrain from issuing deposit-like
71. See Crawford, supra note 6, at 106–07. It is worth noting that failing to prevent
haircuts of deposit-like debt exacerbates the problem of delay: these creditors
would not automatically be made whole and determining how much they should
receive could be a time-consuming process.
72. Steven Schwarcz analyzes the regulators’ move to make the OLA potentially
workable as one from a reactive to a proactive resolution approach. See Steven L.
Schwarcz, Beyond Bankruptcy, (Feb. 16, 2017) (unpublished paper), http://schol
arship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3755/ [https://perma.unl.edu/NBY4-P5
82].
73. Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of
Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76614 (Dec. 18, 2013). It is worth noting that while
the “single point of entry” strategy was originally developed as a way to imple-
ment the Orderly Liquidation Authority provided under Title II of Dodd-Frank,
proposals to amend the bankruptcy code now also routinely assume a single point
of entry strategy for dealing with the failed institution. See infra note 174.
74. Id.
75. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company
Requirements for Systemically Important U.S. Bank Holding Companies and In-
termediate Holding Companies of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Or-
ganizations, 82 Fed. Reg. 8266 (Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Total Loss-Absorbing
Capacity].
76. See Ricks, supra note 13, at 91.
77. See supra notes 46–47, 59–61, and accompanying text.
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claims at the holding company level.78 While many remain skeptical
of how well this combined approach will actually work when push
comes to shove,79 there is a good deal of optimism that it will prove
effective.80
III. TRIGGER PROBLEMS
Much has been written on how to structure the resolution process
for GSIBs so that, once it is triggered, regulators can avoid the terrible
choice between bailouts and contagion risk.81 A critical piece of this
puzzle has, however, largely been overlooked: what criteria should de-
termine when the resolution process is triggered? In this Part, the Ar-
ticle examines aspects of the regulatory landscape that could have
pernicious effects on the decision-making process for triggering a reso-
lution. In the next Part, the Article lays out a framework for a better
approach.
A. The Wrong Trigger: Liquidity
In considering bankruptcy and resolution proceedings, it is useful
to distinguish liquidity crises from capital insolvency.82 I argue in this
section that a liquidity crisis—that is, running low on, or completely
out of, cash and liquid assets necessary for a firm to meet its obliga-
tions—may be an appropriate trigger for non-financial firms entering
78. See supra notes 46–47, 59–61, and accompanying text; see also John Crawford,
Credible Losers: A Regulatory Design for Prudential Market Discipline, 54 AM.
BUS. L.J. 107 (2017) (explaining how the long-term debt and “clean holding com-
pany” requirements make it possible to impose losses on (certain) creditors with-
out creating conditions for contagion).
79. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Bank Bailouts and Property Taxes, BLOOMBERG: VIEW
(June 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-07/bank-
bailouts-and-property-taxes [https://perma.unl.edu/3S6T-AG82] (“The big ques-
tion in post-2008 bank regulation is: Have regulators figured out how to wind up
big failing banks without causing a panic or requiring taxpayer bailouts? And
there has been a ton of skepticism about the answer.”).
80. See, e.g., Joint Comment Letter from John Court, et al. to Robert E. Feldman,
Exec. Sec’y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 7–10 (Feb. 18, 2014) (quoting optimistic state-
ments by a variety of financial regulators); Jerome Powell, Governor, Fed. Re-
serve, Ending “Too Big to Fail,” Remarks at the Institute of International
Bankers 2013 Washington Conference 6 (Mar. 4, 2013) (praising single-point-of-
entry as “a classic simplifier, making theoretically possible something that [had
previously] seemed impossibly complex”).
81. See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alterna-
tive, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
312–13 (Hoover Inst. & Brookings Inst., Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor eds.,
2014); Lubben, supra note 70; Crawford, supra note 78; Randall D. Guynn, Are
Bailouts Inevitable?, 29 YALE J. REG. 121 (2012); Schwarcz, supra note 72.
82. See supra section II.B.
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bankruptcy83 but creates significant difficulties as a trigger for banks
and shadow banks.84 This may be obvious to some readers,85 but it is
important to spell out why it is problematic given its employment in
one of the most important post-crisis regulatory exercises GSIBs must
engage in: crafting a resolution plan or “living will.”86
Living wills—mandated by section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act—are
plans certain banks and bank holding companies must develop that
lay out how they can be unwound in bankruptcy without disrupting
the broader financial system.87 Among other things, the planning pro-
cess may involve making organizational and operational changes to
facilitate a smooth unwinding,88 as well as laying out clearly defined
steps for what the firm will do when its capital or liquidity falls below
pre-established thresholds. Although some have expressed skepticism
about the likelihood that the plans will be worth much once a GSIB is
in bankruptcy,89 there are reasons to think that the process of devel-
83. “Cash flow” insolvency—that is, default on debt—is the trigger for involuntary
bankruptcy filings in the United States. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012). At
the same time, for voluntary bankruptcy filings, capital insolvency is likely the
most common driver—though in the United States, any eligible firm may file so
long as it does so in “good faith,” which does not necessarily mean the firm must
be insolvent (or illiquid). See In re Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F.3d 108 (3d
Cir. 2004) (citing In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999) (identifying
“two inquiries that are particularly relevant to the question of good faith:
(1) whether the petition serves a valid bankruptcy purpose, e.g., by preserving a
going concern or maximizing the value of the debtor’s estate, and (2) whether the
petition is filed merely to obtain a tactical litigation advantage”).
84. It is worth noting that liquidity may be an appropriate trigger for pre-resolution
remedial actions by SIFI regulators. See infra section IV.B.
85. For example, there is a rich literature on establishing triggers for contingent con-
vertible bonds (CoCos). See infra section IV.B. No CoCo proposal of which I am
aware uses a liquidity-based trigger for conversion. See, e.g., Charles W.
Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt
Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 25 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 21, 41–49 (2013) (summarizing proposed triggers from a variety of different
CoCo proposals).
86. See Living Wills (or Resolution Plans), Bd. Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., https://
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/resolution-plans.htm [https://
perma.unl.edu/K3AC-F4F8] (last updated March 1, 2018).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., John Carney, The New Plan to Bail Out ‘Too-Big-to-Fail’ Banks, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-plan-to-bail-out-too-
big-to-fail-banks-1476264604 (describing GSIBs’ reaction to living will guidance
by creating “holding compan[ies] to sit between [the GSIBs’] shareholder-owned
parent compan[ies] and [their] subsidiaries” in order to “hold resources that can
be rushed to support subsidiaries” that cannot be “grabbed” by outside
claimants).
89. Matt Levine, Living Wills Make Banks Think About Death, BLOOMBERG: VIEW
(April 14, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-04-14/living-
wills-force-banks-to-think-about-death [https://perma.unl.edu/29PZ-5MCU] (“It
seems implausible that any big bank could lay out a plan, in the level of detail
that regulators seem to want, that could reliably guide it through any actual
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oping living wills is salutary insofar as it forces bank executives to
think hard about and plan for various threats to the viability of the
firm.90 As Dwight Eisenhower famously observed, when dealing with
emergencies, “plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”91
While this statement is likely true of the living will process in general,
there is at least one feature of regulators’ approach to living will plan-
ning that is pernicious: the requirement that GSIBs have liquidity-
based triggers for filing for bankruptcy.92 In critiquing this require-
ment, it is helpful to distinguish (i) the mandated assumption of GSIB
“self-funding” through bankruptcy—i.e., that the GSIB can do without
government liquidity assistance in bankruptcy—from (ii) the require-
ment that this assumption drive bankruptcy filing decisions.
Self-funding. The Federal Reserve’s and FDIC’s guidance on living
wills directs firms to develop “a methodology for estimating the liquid-
ity needed after the parent’s bankruptcy filing to stabilize the surviv-
ing material entities and to allow those entities to operate post-
filing.”93 It is assumed that the firm’s subsidiaries will continue opera-
bankruptcy. The actual context of a big bank’s failure will determine what the
bank does; a cash-flow budget concocted years earlier to fulfill a regulatory re-
quirement seems unlikely to be a useful guide.”).
90. Matt Levine argues that the exercise of thinking seriously about failure can have
a salutary effect on bank managers:
The point of the living wills . . . is to sit banks down and make them
comb through their businesses in excruciating detail, with a focus on
grim aspects like liquidity crunches and operational risks in bankruptcy.
A useful result of the living wills is that, if they’re done correctly, they
give regulators a good overall picture of how a bank works, how money
flows between its parts, what its pressure points are, and how it re-
sponds to crisis. But a much more important result is that, if they’re
done correctly, they give bankers themselves that same overall picture:
They force a bank’s executives and directors to understand the workings
of the bank in a detailed and comprehensive way. And if they’re done
incorrectly, that’s useful too: They let the regulators and bankers know
what they don’t know.
Id.
91. Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. President, Remarks at the National Defense Execu-
tive Conference (Nov. 14, 1957) (transcript available at http://www.presidency
.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951 [https://perma.unl.edu/NC7K-TKD5]).
92. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
GUIDANCE FOR 2017 § 165(D) ANNUAL RESOLUTION PLAN SUBMISSIONS BY DOMES-
TIC COVERED COMPANIES THAT SUBMITTED REPORTS IN JULY 2015 7–8, https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20160413a1.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/A3X2-B9UD] [hereinafter LIVING WILL GUIDANCE] (di-
recting firms to develop “a methodology for estimating the liquidity needed after
the parent’s bankruptcy filing to stabilize the surviving material entities and to
allow those entities to operate post-filing,” and stating “[t]he [Resolution Liquid-
ity Execution Need (RLEN)] estimate should be incorporated into the firm’s gov-
ernance framework to ensure that the firm files for bankruptcy in a timely way,
i.e., prior to the firm’s [high quality liquid assets] falling below the RLEN
estimate”).
93. Id. at 7.
2018] RESOLUTION TRIGGERS 83
tions in bankruptcy and will be able to meet their obligations with no
liquidity assistance from the government.94
Here it is worth noting that even industrial firms will often need
“debtor-in-possession” financing in bankruptcy to prevent the disrup-
tion of core operations that could lead to the destruction of going-con-
cern value.95 The concern about the disruption of core operations is
magnified with banks and shadow banks, where a firm’s customers
are not simply buying products but using the firm as a place to store
their money based upon the promise that they can access it seamlessly
for near-term transactional needs—which is what, of course, deposits
and deposit equivalents are principally about.96
The living will guidance requires that large banks and BHCs esti-
mate how many such customers/creditors will flee—i.e., withdraw
their funding—in a bankruptcy process and reserve precisely enough
cash and “high quality liquid assets” (which—it is assumed—can eas-
ily and quickly be converted into cash) to meet the withdrawal re-
94. Id. at 6 (“The firm should have the liquidity capabilities necessary to execute its
preferred resolution strategy.”). The assumption is that the firm will continue to
operate even in bankruptcy or resolution—what for a normal firm involves a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy process (reorganization) instead of a Chapter 7 process
(liquidation).
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). As Barry Adler and his co-authors explain,
A new loan—credit from a supplier or cash from a bank—is a common
early objective of a debtor once it files a bankruptcy reorganization peti-
tion. Such a loan is called debtor-in-possession or DIP financing. . . .
Take the case of a trucking firm that has just filed a Chapter 11 peti-
tion. The payroll checks issued yesterday will bounce unless postpetition
financing is found. From a theoretical perspective, one might think that
all the payroll checks should bounce. The workers, after all, have only
prepetition claims. They should not be paid until the end of the case. But
the debtor will likely take a more practical view. If the checks bounced,
the workers likely would not work anymore and the firm would have to
close down. If the debtor’s trucking business is viable despite the bank-
ruptcy, this would be a loss to all.
BARRY E. ADLER ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 479 (Rob-
ert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007).
96. Assistant Vice President of the New York Federal Reserve Joseph Sommer dis-
tinguishes between “bonded debt,” such as corporate bonds, and “financial liabili-
ties,” such as bank deposits, and observes,
[T]his notion of a financial liability as a product has implications for in-
solvency law, apart from priorities. Insolvency law assumes that firms
often need a breathing spell from their creditors, so that they can pick
themselves up, continue operating, and start reorganizing. It therefore
places all claims in a collective procedure and places a moratorium on
efforts to collect assets. However, financial products are operations of the
financial firm. Freezing performance on a financial product, whether by
automatic stay or treatment as a claim, is akin to prohibiting a carmaker
in Chapter 11 from making and selling cars, or an airline from selling
tickets, buying jet fuel, and flying planes.
Joseph H. Sommer, Why Bail-In? And How!, 2014 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 207,
211, 217.
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quests.97 On one hand, to prevent this from turning into something
like a one hundred percent reserve requirement,98 GSIBs must as-
sume that many short-term creditors in these circumstances will not
run—that is, not withdraw or refuse to roll over their loans. On the
other hand, it is perilous to assume that many such customers/credi-
tors will willingly stay put if there is even the slightest concern about
the outcome of the bankruptcy process or the specter of delay.99
There is thus a tension. A potential resolution of the tension might
lie in recognizing that even if the assumption of self-funding is ill-
founded, (i) there are, in fact, ways the government could step in to
provide any required funding if worse came to worst,100 but that
(ii) forcing firms to operate under the assumption that the government
will not do so will have a healthy impact on their liquidity
management.101
97. See LIVING WILL GUIDANCE, supra note 92, at 6. It is worth noting that the as-
sumption that non-cash assets will be able to be monetized quickly could be
tested during a crisis. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
98. A one hundred percent reserve requirement would require banks to hold one hun-
dred percent of their deposits in vault cash (or on deposit at the Federal Reserve).
As noted above, banks do not hold all deposits in reserve. See Reserve Require-
ments, supra note 48 and accompanying text. In this context, there would be two
differences: first, the requirement could be met not only with cash and accounts
at the Federal Reserve but also with highly liquid assets such as Treasuries. Sec-
ond, the requirement would be set not by deposits but by all “runnable” debt—
uninsured deposits and other short-term claims on the GSIB.
99. For example, even depositors under the federal insurance cap began withdrawing
their savings from Washington Mutual, the giant thrift, in the days leading up to
its failure on September 25, 2008, due to concerns over potential delays in acces-
sing their money. See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Deposit Run at WaMu Forced Their
Hand, Regulators Say, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008, 8:25 PM), http://latimes-
blogs.latimes.com/money_co/2008/09/just-as-with-in.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
FH94-PL66] (quoting one customer who “had withdrawn nearly his entire busi-
ness account from the Laguna Hills branch the week before on the advice of fi-
nancial advisors, even though his account did not exceed federal insurance
limits,” and explaining “ ‘[a]ny interruptions would cause real problems in my
life’”).
100. For example, if the OLA is invoked, the FDIC, which would be responsible for the
resolution process, would be able to borrow from the Treasury Department, lend-
ing the money on to recapitalized GSIB, so that the GSIB could meet redemption
demands from its creditors. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n) (2012). It might also be possible
that the Federal Reserve could lend to the recapitalized GSIB using its emer-
gency lending authorities, despite post-crisis restrictions that have been placed
on this authority. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012); see also John Crawford, The Moral Haz-
ard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 121–22
(outlining ways that the Federal Reserve might work around the ostensible re-
strictions on its emergency lending authorities). Although the Federal Reserve
cannot lend to insolvent institutions, the bridge holding company it would lend to
in a Title II resolution should, in theory, be solvent as it would not adopt the old
holding company’s long-term debt obligations. See supra section II.C.
101. This is somewhat similar to the idea of “constructive ambiguity,” an approach
advocated by some for lender-of-last-resort function. Under this approach, regula-
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Liquidity as Trigger. As with the living will process in general,
then, it may be possible to believe that the self-funding-through-bank-
ruptcy assumption is both absurd on its face and salutary in its ef-
fects. What is clearly harmful, however, is mandating that this
assumption drive bankruptcy filing decisions. The Federal Reserve’s
guidance directs that firms estimate the liquidity they will need in
bankruptcy or resolution—the so-called Resolution Liquidity Execu-
tion Need (RLEN)—and that this “estimate should be incorporated
into the firm’s governance framework to ensure that the firm files for
bankruptcy in a timely way, i.e., prior to the firm’s [high quality liquid
assets] falling below the RLEN estimate.”102
There are two significant problems with this directive. First, as
noted above, illiquidity does not necessarily imply insolvency.103 It is
possible for the value of a bank’s assets to exceed its liabilities, but for
withdrawal demands to overwhelm cash reserves or easily salable as-
sets. The liquidity tripwire for banks mandated in the Federal Re-
serve’s guidance for GSIB living wills could therefore lead to the
death, or at least disruption,104 of a viable institution. This is particu-
larly so during widespread crises. Indeed, the aim of preventing such
needless harm undergirds the most famous of all crisis-fighting rules,
“Bagehot’s dictum:” “to avert panic, central banks should lend early
and freely (ie [sic], without limit), to solvent firms, against good collat-
eral, and at ‘high rates[.]’ ”105 In a widespread crisis, it is possible that
the Federal Reserve would extend such lending, as it did throughout
2008,106 thus enabling GSIBs to avoid tripping their own liquidity
tors do not commit to rescuing firms facing a liquidity crisis, in order to mitigate
moral hazard and induce firms to take precautions so that they will not need
emergency support; but at the same time, regulators maintain flexibility to inter-
vene if a liquidity crisis nevertheless comes to pass in order to prevent systemic
spillovers. See, e.g., Charles A. E. Goodhart & Haizhou Huang, A Model of the
Lender of Last Resort 25 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 99/39, 1999),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp9939.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
ZFV6-BJ2D]. The strategy suggested here, however, need not employ ambiguity:
regulators could commit to intervention, while compelling banks to pretend like
there will be no intervention. Of course, this latter approach relies not on market
discipline but on regulatory rules about liquidity management.
102. LIVING WILL GUIDANCE, supra note 92, at 7–8.
103. See supra section II.B.
104. If a GSIB bankruptcy follows the single-point-of-entry process, supra section II.C,
then the GSIB’s operating subsidiaries would not be killed off but rather trans-
ferred to a new bridge holding company.
105. Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Remarks at the Bank of Japan
2009 International Conference “Financial System and Monetary Policy: Imple-
mentation”: The Repertoire of Official Sector Interventions in the Financial Sys-
tem: Last Resort Lending, Market-Making, and Capital 3 (May 27–28, 2009)
(transcript available at https://www.bis.org/review/r090608c.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/M5JX-SR5S]). Walter Bagehot was a 19th century financial
writer, editor of The Economist, and author of the classic Lombard Street.
106. See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 2, at 18–40.
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wire for a bankruptcy filing. But if the Federal Reserve has not (yet)
established such a program in a budding crisis, the liquidity trigger
could exacerbate vicious crisis dynamics.107 This gives rise to the sec-
ond, and potentially more serious, problem with the Federal Reserve’s
guidance. As Paul Tucker, former Deputy Governor of the Bank of En-
gland, has observed,
When distressed, banks and others often choose to cut back lending, as well as
to sell assets, in order to save liquidity and reduce leverage. If, as in late 2008
and early 2009, working capital financing is rationed, the transmission into
economic activity can be rapid and pronounced. . . . The interlinkages within
the system can prompt individual firms to take desperate efforts to stave off
bankruptcy and its attendant costs, if others seem to be ailing. But such mea-
sures may have perverse effects for the system as a whole when the mitigating
action is fire sales that depress asset values, reducing household wealth and
increasing businesses’ cost of capital.108
Professor Hal Scott makes a similar point when he observes:
[T]he new adoption of private liquidity requirements represents a retreat by
the Fed from providing public liquidity as the [lender of last resort]. Ironi-
cally, the individual private liquidity requirements may actually reduce col-
lective private liquidity because they require each bank to hoard its own
liquidity rather than making it available to others when not needed.109
Of course, if one risk of a liquidity trigger is that it could lead to the
death or disruption of a viable bank and potentially exacerbate crisis
dynamics, there is also the more familiar risk that liquidity will even-
tually force regulators’ hands, but only after it is too late—i.e., after
the losses have grown to such an extent that regulators are faced with
the dilemma of either engaging in a bailout (even if it is veiled) or
risking significant contagion effects from failing to protect deposit-like
debt. This more familiar risk, however, suggests we should work to
bolster capital-based triggers—a subject addressed in the next
section.
107. Recall that the Federal Reserve is no longer authorized to engage in emergency
lending with the specific purpose of saving a particular institution. See supra
notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
108. Paul Tucker, The Design and Governance of Financial Stability Regimes: A Com-
mon-Resource Problem That Challenges Technical Know-How, Democratic Ac-
countability and International Coordination, in 3 CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION ESSAYS ON INT’L FIN. 1, 8 (Sept. 2016).
109. Scott, supra note 60, at 13–14. Scott takes his critique a step further, attacking
bank liquidity requirements more generally: “[B]ank liquidity requirements may
worsen a crisis as banks are forced to hoard liquid assets and are thus unable to
lend to one another. That’s the worst medicine: In a crisis, you want banks to lend
to other institutions that need money.” Hal S. Scott, To Spur Small Business,
First Free the Banks, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
05/15/opinion/bank-regulations-liquidity.html. Scott, then, believes liquidity re-
quirements can be pernicious even outside the context of bankruptcy triggers.
While there may be good arguments on either side of that debate, using liquidity
as a bankruptcy filing trigger for a bank seems clearly to fail the cost-benefit
analysis.
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B. Capital and Timeliness
If using liquidity as a resolution trigger has harmful consequences,
the obvious alternative is capital. Using capital as a triggering metric
may, however, lead to too much delay in putting GSIBs into resolu-
tion.110 In this section, I lay out the costs of delay and explore the
various causes for it.
1. The Costs of Delay
While acting too early may waste administrative resources and
risk needlessly disrupting the financial system, acting too late creates
the risk of compounding losses such that they outstrip the parent com-
pany’s TLAC.111 We then wind up in the same predicament the new
resolution mechanisms were designed to help us avoid: a choice be-
tween bailout or risking contagion. If there is no bailout and losses are
imposed on deposit-like claimants, the risk of catastrophic contagion
rises significantly.112 But if losses are not imposed on these claimants,
then they must be absorbed by the rest of the industry or by
taxpayers.113
A threshold question in understanding the costs of trigger shyness
is why a bank’s losses might be expected to worsen with delay. After
all, banks generally make money, and their executives and employees
presumably want to make money. It is possible, therefore, that if we
leave an undercapitalized bank alone, it will dig its way out of the hole
and back into solvency.114 There are, however, both theoretical and
historical reasons to think that a less happy scenario—one in which
110. As noted, the OLA’s invocation requires a determination by the Treasury Secre-
tary that a “financial company is in default or in danger of default.” 12 U.S.C.
§ 5383(b)(1) (2012). This is unlikely on its own to provide discipline in the timely
invocation of OLA—indeed, given banks’ ability to continue operating for ex-
tended periods while insolvent so long as they do not face runs, see supra subsec-
tion III.B.1.ii, one can imagine OLA’s invocation may be limited, under current
law, to situations in which a SIFI is facing a crippling run, which may be too late
to avoid metastatic losses from swamping TLAC. See Total Loss-Absorbing Ca-
pacity, supra note 75.
111. See supra section II.C.
112. See Scott, supra note 60 and accompanying text.
113. Other industry actors might absorb losses if, for example, the FDIC provides
funding to a GSIB in resolution, but if the GSIB cannot repay the money, the
FDIC can recover the sums from other eligible financial companies. 12 U.S.C.
§ 5390(o)(1)(D)(ii) (2012).
114. Indeed, some suggest this is what happened with GSIBs post-crisis, with a good
deal of government help. See, e.g., Steve Randy Waldman, Yes, Virginia. The
Banks Really Were Bailed Out., INTERFLUIDITY BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011, 9:08 AM),
http://www.interfluidity.com/v2/2587.html [https://perma.unl.edu/66SA-46HE]
(“After assuming the banking system’s downside risk, the US government engi-
neered a wide variety of favorable circumstances that helped banks ‘earn’ their
way back to quasi-health.”).
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losses metastasize at a weak or dying bank—remains a significant
risk, and that regulators should therefore act swiftly once they deter-
mine a bank is insolvent or nearing insolvency.
a. “Gambling for Resurrection” I: Theory
From a theoretical standpoint, shareholders of an insolvent firm
have an incentive to make risky bets to “gamble for resurrection.”115
This is primarily due to shareholders’ limited liability: they cannot be
forced to contribute (further) resources to the firm if the firm defaults
on its debt. Once the firm’s losses outstrip equity, losses fall on credi-
tors, while shareholders’ other assets are protected.116 Shareholders of
thinly or negatively capitalized banks are therefore likely to discount
the potential downside of risky investments, “shifting” losses onto
creditors, the deposit insurance fund, or the taxpayer.117 Indeed,
shareholders may have an incentive to make risky bets even when the
gamble has a negative expected value.
To illustrate this dynamic, consider the stylized example of a firm
whose liabilities exceed the value of its assets by $20, but which has
not yet been placed in bankruptcy or resolution proceedings. The firm
is considering two investments. Investment (1) has a ten percent
chance of gaining $100 and a ninety percent chance of losing $100;
and investment (2) has a ninety percent chance of gaining $10 and a
ten percent chance of losing $10. The first investment has an expected
value of negative $80,118 while the second has an expected value of
(positive) $8.119 The second bet is thus superior from the aggregate
115. See, e.g., ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 33 (2013) (“Gambling for resur-
rection, taking bets in the spirit of ‘heads I win; tails, my creditors lose’ may be
tempting if there is no other way to avoid bankruptcy.”).
116. As Andrew Haldane, chief economist and executive director of monetary analysis
and statistics at the Bank of England, puts it, “while uncertainty increases both
upside and downside risks, downside risks are capped by limited liability. For
shareholders, the sky is the limit but the floor is always just beneath their feet.
To maximi[z]e shareholder value, therefore, banks need simply to seek bigger
and riskier bets.” Andrew G. Haldane, The Doom Loop, in 34 LONDON REVIEW OF
BOOKS 21, 21 (2012), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n04/andrew-haldane/the-doom-
loop [https://perma.unl.edu/QD3F-GC45].
117. This type of “risk-shifting” behavior was most famously modeled in Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). See also Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy, 57 J. FIN.
445, 447 (2002) (stating equity holders may favor a more risky investment “even
if the risky project offers a somewhat lower expected return”); Robert E. Scott,
The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436, 1448–49 (1997)
(recognizing debt can carry “an incentive for the firm’s managers . . . to engage in
higher-risk projects” which “can lead to excessively risky investments”).
118. This is equal to 0.1 * $100 – 0.9 * $100.
119. This is equal to 0.9 * $10 – 0.1 * $10.
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perspective of all stakeholders in the firm; while it will not return the
firm to solvency, it will mitigate the losses to creditors. The sharehold-
ers, however, do not bear any of the losses in either scenario; because
capital is already negative, any further losses will be borne by credi-
tors. Therefore, the expected return to shareholders from the two in-
vestments yields a different result: the expected return to
shareholders of the first potential investment is $8,120 whereas the
expected value of the second potential investment is zero.121 The
shareholder will thus prefer the first investment in this stylized exam-
ple, even though both the probability of loss and the magnitude of loss
in the downside scenario will be much greater.
This example illustrates potential perverse incentives for share-
holders, but, of course, managers are the ones making the actual deci-
sions for the firm.122 Managers of insolvent banks may, however, face
a similar asymmetric payoff profile even if their only goal is to pre-
serve their job.123 Furthermore, the standard executive pay package
at GSIBs includes a significant degree of equity-based compensa-
tion.124 As Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann have observed,
“[b]ecause bank executives expect to share in any gains that might
flow to common shareholders, but are insulated from losses that the
realization of risks could impose on preferred shareholders, bondhold-
ers, depositors, and taxpayers, executives have incentives to give in-
sufficient weight to the downside of risky strategies.”125
It is important to note that the thicker a firm’s capital cushion is,
the less shareholders and managers will be able to shift losses onto
other claimants, and the less the perverse risk-shifting incentives
highlighted in the above example will apply. As Richard Carnell ex-
plains, “[c]apital is like the deductible on an insurance policy: the
120. This is equal to 0.1 * ($100 – $20). Note that even in this good state of the world,
the shareholders will need to spend $20 to climb out of their capital hole. The
$100 in (further) losses in the event of failure is ignored by shareholders in this
stylized example: again, shareholders have already lost everything and due to
limited liability, do not bear any further liability for the firm’s losses.
121. Even in the good state of the world, in which the investment yields $10, this will
serve merely to mitigate losses to creditors and will not fill the capital hole of $20.
The equity position of the firm will continue to be negative.
122. See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPO-
RATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) (positing the separation of ownership and
control under modern corporate structures).
123. This is true if the manager’s job retention is contingent on the bank’s “resurrec-
tion.” See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 115 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., PAUL HODGSON ET AL., COUNCIL OF INST’AL INV’RS, WALL STREET PAY:
SIZE, STRUCTURE, AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR SHAREOWNERS 7 (2010), http://online.
wsj.com/public/resources/documents/CIIWhitePaperWallStreetPayFINAL113020
10.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/D44W-SV5U] (showing the various components of
CEO compensation at the largest financial institutions).
125. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 247 (2010).
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higher the deductible, the greater the incentive to avoid loss. As capi-
tal falls, an institution’s incentives to avoid loss fall with it.”126 Thus,
the perverse incentives described here are likely to arise precisely
when initial losses have already eroded a firm’s capital.
b. “Gambling for Resurrection” II: History
While the example above is highly stylized, the dynamic of “gam-
bling for resurrection” was central to the savings & loan (S&L) crisis
of the 1980s.127 S&Ls were a type of insured depository institution
specializing in making mortgage loans.128 (They met the functional
definition of what we have defined as a bank.)129 Hundreds of S&Ls
failed during the 1980s, but a large number were permitted to con-
tinue operating for extended periods—often years—with capital buff-
ers that were razor thin, or even negative by some measures.130 At the
outset of the crisis, trouble arose primarily from rising market inter-
est rates, rather than from rising defaults by those that had borrowed
from the bank.131 Rising interest rates increased the interest the
S&Ls had to pay to their depositors, but did not increase the money
flowing into the S&Ls from their existing stock of assets—primarily
long-term fixed-rate mortgages.132 (The rates on these mortgages had
been set before market interest rates rose.) According to Bert Ely, “In
1981 and 1982 the interest rate spreads for S&Ls (the difference be-
tween the average interest rate on their mortgage portfolios and their
average cost of funds) were –1.0 percent and –0.7 percent, respec-
tively.”133 Measuring assets by what they could be sold for in the mar-
126. Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Im-
provement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 320 (1993).
127. For a good, comprehensive account of the S&L crisis, see LAWRENCE J. WHITE,
THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION
(1991).
128. See, e.g., id. at 13.
129. See supra section II.A.
130. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 127, at 19 tbl.2-5; see also Elijah Brewer III, Full-
Blown Crisis, Half-Measure Cure, 13 ECON. PERSP. 2, 3 fig.1 (Nov. 1989) (showing
the solvency of the S&L industry from 1980–1988 under regulatory accounting
principles, generally accepted accounting principles, tangible accounting princi-
ples, and market value accounting).
131. Bert Ely, Savings and Loan Crisis, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONS.
(David R. Henderson ed., 2d ed. 2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Sav
ingsandLoanCrisis.html [https://perma.unl.edu/KVV7-697T]. Rising interest
rates created a problem for S&Ls because their liabilities were short-term, while
their holdings included lots of long-term assets like mortgages. The interest rates
for the mortgages were fixed at prevailing (low) rates, while the interest rates on
the S&L’s deposits shot up. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
2018] RESOLUTION TRIGGERS 91
ket rather than with historical accounting methods,134 many S&Ls
owed more than their assets were worth—that is, they were
insolvent.135
Regulators, however, permitted market-insolvent S&Ls to con-
tinue operating, hoping they would dig themselves out of their holes,
and slackening various rules to permit them to make the attempt. One
trick (among many) regulators used for this purpose involved the in-
vention of a new instrument called the “income capital certificate”
(ICC).136 The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC)—the now-defunct agency that served the same function for
S&Ls that the FDIC did for other depositories137—permitted S&Ls
that were too sick to raise capital from private investors to instead
raise capital by issuing ICCs to the FSLIC.138 Then, instead of receiv-
ing cash (in exchange for shares) on private markets, the S&Ls would
receive promissory notes from the FSLIC (which was severely under-
134. If a mortgage is valued at $100 when a bank makes the loan, historical account-
ing methods will maintain the $100 value less any principal payments made on
the mortgage. Market measures of accounting, however, could yield a quite differ-
ent valuation, even in the absence of default risk, if interest rates change. In
order to understand why this is so, imagine
a perpetual bond, sold to the public for $100 and promising $5 interest
per annum. This implies market interest rates of five percent. As long as
the relevant market interest rate stays at five percent—and assuming
away credit risk—the bondholder will be able to sell the bond for $100.
Now imagine interest rates jump to ten percent. This means that other
investors can now secure the same income stream of $5 per annum for
just $50. No one would pay more than $50 for an equivalent cashflow.
Thus, the original bond, which could be sold for $100 yesterday, will only
fetch $50 today. The value of the bond has declined due to a change in
market interest rates. This is true even if the bond has zero default risk
and the secondary market for it is infinitely liquid.
Of course, most debt claims are not perpetual. It turns out, however,
that the longer the remaining maturity of the debt claim, the more a
given jump in interest rates eats into the claim’s value. (Equivalently,
the sooner you can withdraw your principal and put it to work at the
higher interest rates, the less you lose.).
John Crawford, Shining a Light on Shadow Money, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
185, 193–94 (2016).
135. See WHITE, supra note 127, at 80 tbl.5-7. It is important to note that most of these
S&Ls remained solvent according to regulatory accounting standards. Id. at 86
tbl.5-9. See also infra subsection III.B.2.iii (discussing the shortcomings of capital
as a measure of solvency).
136. Michael Dotsey & Anatoli Kuprianov, Reforming Deposit Insurance: Lessons from
the Savings and Loan Crisis, 76 FED. RES. BANK OF RICH. ECON. REV. 3, 12 (1990).
137. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 abol-
ished FSLIC. Rose Marie Kushmeider, The U.S. Federal Financial Regulatory
System: Restructuring Federal Bank Regulation, 17 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 4
(2005), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/br17n4full.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/MR7U-ESAS].
138. Dotsey & Kuprianov, supra note 136, at 12.
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capitalized itself).139 The ICCs were subordinate to all of the bank’s
other liabilities. This meant that if push came to shove and the bank
did fail, the FSLIC would have to absorb losses in the amount of the
promissory notes before any uninsured creditors did.140 This was not
the only such gimmick.141
In addition to these accounting tricks, the activities that S&Ls
were permitted to engage in expanded:
In 1980 and again in 1982, Congress and the regulators granted S&Ls the
power to invest directly in service corporations, permitted them to make real
estate loans without regard to the geographical location of the loan, and au-
thorized them to hold up to 40 percent of their assets as commercial real es-
tate loans.142
As Bert Ely also wrote, “Congress and the Reagan administration
naı¨vely hoped that if S&Ls made higher-yielding, but riskier, invest-
ments, they would make more money to offset the long-term damage
caused by fixed-rate mortgages.”143 Many S&Ls responded by getting
more aggressive (that is, less careful) in their underwriting and risk
management.144 The unhappy result was that, “[u]nlike the initial fi-
nancial difficulties of most insolvent thrifts, which were largely attrib-
utable to the effect of high interest rates on the value of their
mortgage portfolios, most losses after 1982 stemmed from credit qual-
ity problems.”145 Figure 2, below, illustrates how even after falling in-
terest rates had partially reversed the interest-rate-based losses that
had initially caused the S&Ls’ problems, losses ballooned due prima-
rily to defaults on risky loans and investments that insolvent but
(newly) unfettered S&Ls had made.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Another gimmick to facilitate the sale of dying S&Ls to (relatively) healthy S&Ls
(thus saving FSLIC from having to intervene) permitted the acquiring institution
to
count as good will the difference between the market value of assets ac-
quired and the value of liabilities assumed. If a firm acquired an S&L
with assets whose market value was five billion dollars and whose liabil-
ities were six billion . . . , the one-billion dollar difference was counted as
goodwill, and the goodwill was then counted as capital.
Ely, supra note 131.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Dotsey & Kuprianov, supra note 136, at 14 (stating that because the government
allowed them to continue operating and federal insurance kept depositors from
running, “many insolvent thrifts found it easy to engage in a variety of risky and
imprudent investment schemes. As time went on, evidence surfaced that the
losses at many institutions were attributable to gross mismanagement . . . .”).
Greater aggressiveness in lending increased the risk of losses but also the poten-
tial profitability if things went well.
145. Id.
2018] RESOLUTION TRIGGERS 93
Figure 2: Accumulated Losses Arising from S&L Crisis146
Ultimately the S&L industry bankrupted the FSLIC and had to be
bailed out by taxpayers to the tune of $124 billion.147
c. Resolution’s Salutary Effect on Incentives
As we have seen, the preferred resolution strategy that authorities
have adopted for GSIBs involves recapitalizing the parent holding
company so that old equity is zeroed out and long-term debt is con-
verted to equity in a new holding company, while the actual activities
of the GSIB’s operational subsidiaries continue uninterrupted.148 If
the central problem with delayed resolution is the snowball effect of
losses due to management’s perverse incentives to gamble for resur-
rection, one might ask how placing the firm into resolution, but al-
lowing it to continue its operations, changes that calculus.
There are at least two ways in which the resolution process may
help stanch the losses of a GSIB. First, the very act of recapitalizing
the firm should have salutary effects on incentives; it automatically
increases the size of the firm’s capital buffer,149 thereby reducing the
risk-shifting incentives of the firm’s residual claimants, making them
146. Ely, supra note 131, at fig.1 (titled “FSLIC/Resolution Trust Corporation’s
Accumulation of Losses During the 1980s and Early 1990s (quarterly estimates—
June 30, 1980, to June 30, 1992)”).
147. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth
and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 33 (2000).
148. See supra section II.C.
149. As we have seen, capital is a measure of assets minus liabilities. By eliminating
long-term debt as liabilities, and converting it into equity claims, the result of
(assets – liabilities) increases.
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less likely to prefer strategies with high upsides but a high risk of
failure.150
Second, the resolution of a large financial firm is likely to be ac-
companied by the removal of the executives deemed responsible for
the firm’s failure—indeed, the OLA requires their removal.151 In
many instances, one might expect new management—particularly to
the degree its mandate is seen as steadying a faltering ship—to be less
invested in trying to redeem bets gone bad with the sorts of high-risk
wagers that define the gambling-for-resurrection dynamics. In partic-
ular, if new managers do not feel personally invested in particular un-
derperforming projects or divisions, they might be more willing to cut
losses by selling them or shutting them down.
2. Causes of Delay
There are several causes of delay in triggering resolution or bank-
ruptcy proceedings for failing financial firms. First, shareholders and
managers have incentives to delay filing for bankruptcy in the absence
of a liquidity crisis. Similarly, the incentive structure facing regula-
tors leans heavily against proactive resolution. Finally, capital, the
principal metric for determining when to place a firm into resolution,
tends to lag real-time economic developments.
a. Private Actors’ Bias Towards Delay
A filing for bankruptcy may be either voluntary—that is, with the
cooperation of the firm’s management and board of directors—or in-
voluntary. Under certain conditions, creditors can force an involun-
tary filing upon the firm’s defaulting on a debt payment.152 As argued
above, this is likely an appropriate trigger for nonfinancial firms, but
a bad trigger for financial firms.153 What, then, about a voluntary fil-
ing based on a deteriorating capital position?
As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that even as the living
will guidelines create liquidity and capital tripwires for bankruptcy,
they do not create a legal duty for boards of directors to file for bank-
ruptcy at those points; the directors’ duties are still defined by state
law. In any event, there are strong reasons to believe that SIFI man-
agers will have incentives not to file for bankruptcy in a timely man-
ner if the matter were left to them. First, to the degree managers’
interests align with shareholders’ due (for example) to equity-based
compensation, they will likely want to delay filing for as long as possi-
ble. As Robert Merton observed in 1974, shareholders’ claims on a firm
150. See Carnell, supra note 126 and accompanying text.
151. 12 U.S.C. § 5386(4) (2012).
152. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012).
153. See infra section III.A.
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can be modeled as call options on the firm’s assets.154 Even if a firm
has negative capital,155 its shares are likely to have positive value due
to the fact that the shareholders, like (out-of-the-money) call option
holders, can claim the upside value of the firm if it eventually climbs
out of its capital hole.156 A bankruptcy filing, however, generally has
the effect of terminating, or at least greatly reducing, the option value
of the shares, as equity is typically zeroed out, or at least significantly
diluted, in the bankruptcy process.157 (The extinguishment of share-
holders’ claims effectively terminates their option on the firm’s as-
sets.)158 For this reason, shareholders likely prefer to remain out of
bankruptcy for as long as possible, so as not to foreclose the chance of
profiting if gambling for resurrection pays off.159
Beyond this, managers may view a bankruptcy filing as an admis-
sion of failure and resist such an admission to the degree it is inconsis-
tent with their self-image. Finally, there are good reasons to believe
that a bankruptcy process that is not done in close coordination with
regulators could wind up having a destructive impact on the surviving
operations of the firm,160 and managers may (understandably) wish to
avoid this.
b. Regulators’ Bias Towards Delay
If private actors have an incentive to delay filing, the natural fol-
low-up question is why regulators would permit BHCs with razor-thin
or negative capital to gamble for resurrection.161 One reason, of
course, is that they may not appreciate the logic behind BHCs’ risk-
shifting incentives; as noted, these firms surely do not want to lose
money.162
154. See generally Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Struc-
ture of Interest Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449 (1974).
155. See supra section II.B.
156. See Out of the Money – OTM, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/
o/outofthemoney.asp [https://perma.unl.edu/T9DE-R3LP] (explaining out-of-the-
money options and their valuation).
157. Bankruptcy does not always automatically mean equity is zeroed out. See gener-
ally Allan C. Eberhardt et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute
Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990) (describing share-
holders’ success in extracting value from their claims in bankruptcy proceedings).
158. One of the factors that determines the value of an option is the time to expiration;
after the expiration date, the option is worthless. See generally Fischer Black &
Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON.
637 (1973).
159. See supra subsection III.B.1.
160. See infra note 178 and accompanying text and note 179.
161. Regulators have authority to place financial companies into the OLA process
upon a determination of “systemic risk.” 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2012). They can also
exert moral suasion on firms’ boards of directors to file for bankruptcy if they
believe the firm is not viable.
162. See supra subsection III.B.1.i.
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Another set of reasons might be grouped together under the rubric
of “capture”—the excessive identification of regulators with the indus-
try they regulate. This can, of course, arise from a direct conflict of
interest—for example, when a regulator acquiesces to decision-mak-
ers at a firm where she hopes one day to work.163 It can, however,
take subtler forms, like when a regulator shows “deference to high-
status regulated executives [or] to those with whom [she] has face-to-
face relationships, because of empathy or the desire to avoid con-
flict.”164 While a decision on triggering a SIFI resolution would be
made at the highest level, capture could be a problem even if it af-
fected only lower-level regulators, if it were to shape the information
high-level officials received.165
A third factor—particularly salient in the context of the S&L cri-
sis—is that when problems affect the banking system as a whole, reg-
ulators may fear they lack the resources, in terms of personnel and
163. For example, in the book Flashboys, Michael Lewis strongly implies that staffers
at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had a conflict of interest in
overseeing high frequency trading firms (HFTs) based on hopes of future employ-
ment with these entities. Lewis describes a presentation at the SEC by former
Royal Bank of Canada employee Brad Katsuyama explaining a new product
(“Thor”) aimed at preventing HFTs from front-running broker-dealers’ and other
institutional investors’ bids. A young SEC staffer surprised Katsuyama by argu-
ing that “Thor” was unfair to HFTs. This led to a lively debate among the SEC
staff, with older staffers taking Katsuyama’s side and younger ones the side of
HFTs. Lewis reports,
After the meeting, RBC conducted a study, never released publicly, in
which they found that more than two hundred SEC staffers since 2007
had left their government jobs to work for high-frequency trading firms
or the firms that lobbied Washington on their behalf. Some of these peo-
ple had played central roles in deciding how, or even whether, to regu-
late high-frequency trading. For instance, in June 2010, the associate
director of the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, Elizabeth King,
had quit the SEC to work for Getco[, a large HFT]. The SEC, like the
public stock exchanges, had a kind of equity stake in the future revenues
of high-frequency traders.
MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 106 (Michael Lewis ed., 1st
ed. 2014).
164. Philip Wallach, What is Regulatory Capture?, THE NEW RAMBLER (2015), http://
newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/political-science/what-is-regulatory-capture
[https://perma.unl.edu/96EZ-THEE] (reviewing DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A.
MOSS, PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW
TO LIMIT IT (2014)).
165. For example, a study of the failure of the large bank Washington Mutual (WaMu)
found that bank examiners had repeatedly noted weaknesses in areas such as
asset quality and risk controls, but continued to award the bank a “2,” or “satis-
factory,” on its regulatory rating scale. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFFICES OF IN-
SPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION OF FEDERAL REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF WASHINGTON
MUTUAL BANK 2, 8, 10, 15, 16 (2010). The study concluded, “[g]iven the multiple
repeat findings related to asset quality and management, and considering the
definitions of the composite ratings, it is difficult to understand how [the regula-
tor] continued to assign WaMu a composite 2-rating year after year.” Id. at 16.
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funds to pay off insured depositors, to tackle the problem head on by
shutting down multiple institutions.166
A fourth factor that was relevant in the recent crisis is that even as
regulators use the proper theoretical criterion for triggering resolution
(viz., capital), the way that they measure it is flawed and does not
capture the “real” state of the bank’s balance sheet.167 I will return to
this point below.168
Fifth, there may be concern about political backlash when the
SIFI’s managers and lobbyists contest the finding of nonviability. The
plausibility of these objections will be higher where there is no liquid-
ity crisis—and of course, one argument of this Article is that the trig-
gering process should be independent of liquidity crises, as bank
resolution in the era of the FDIC tends to be. As Paul Tucker has ob-
served, “If faced with uncertain long-term benefits but an immediate
risk of unpopularity, a policy maker might incline toward delaying ac-
tion until the resilience-eroding threats of exuberance or imbalances
were widely perceived.”169
A final factor, particularly important in the context of GSIBs, is
that regulators may harbor concerns about the efficacy of the resolu-
tion process to prevent contagious spill-overs.170 Here it is worth men-
tioning a potential development that is of profound importance to
trigger-timing: the proposed repeal of the OLA and its replacement
with a new subchapter of the bankruptcy code drafted specifically to
deal with the failure of a GSIB.171 While the Trump administration
has backed away from repealing OLA,172 the idea’s popularity with
some members of Congress makes it worth briefly addressing.173
The repeal of OLA would represent a significant step backwards
despite the fact that several of the best aspects of regulators’ current
OLA strategy—single-point-of-entry resolution and long-term debt at
the holding company as a pre-positioned loss absorber—have largely
been integrated into the proposed reforms of the bankruptcy code.174
166. See Dotsey & Kuprianov, supra note 136, at 12 (“The [S&L] industry’s staggering
losses overwhelmed the resources of the FSLIC. Hundreds more institutions that
had become economically insolvent were not closed because the FSLIC lacked the
resources to deal with them.”).
167. See, e.g., infra note 191 and accompanying text.
168. See infra subsection III.B.2.iii.
169. Tucker, supra note 108, at 48.
170. Skeel, supra note 81, at 324–25.
171. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter
CHOICE Act 2.0].
172. DEP’T OF TREASURY, ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY AND BANKRUPTCY REFORM:
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM ISSUED APRIL 21, 2017 (2018).
173. CHOICE Act 2.0, Title I.
174. See, e.g., John C. Dugan & Randy Benjenk, CHOICE Act 2.0: House Financial
Services Committee Revises Regulatory Reform Bill, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
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There are strong reasons to believe that the repeal of OLA would sig-
nificantly increase the chance that the bankruptcy/resolution process
will go awry. Some of these reasons are specific to the reforms that
have been proposed, while others are likely inherent in any regulatory
scheme that relies solely on bankruptcy to deal with the failure of a
GSIB. Among the former reasons are a lack of a viable liquidity pro-
vider,175 the disempowerment of regulators to trigger a bankruptcy
GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (May 8, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/
05/08/choice-act-2-0-house-financial-services-committee-revises-regulatory-re
form-bill/ [https://perma.unl.edu/E8N9-BEFT] (stating that the proposed new
bankruptcy code subchapter in the CHOICE Act “is intended to facilitate the ‘sin-
gle point of entry’ strategy that most G-SIBs have adopted in their resolution
plans”).
175. CHOICE Act 2.0, unlike Dodd-Frank Title II, lacks a mechanism to provide li-
quidity to the GSIB while it is in resolution. Id. Under Title II, the FDIC can,
within certain limits, borrow from the Department of Treasury to lend to the
GSIB so it can meet its obligations as they come due. 12 U.S.C. § 5384(d) (2012).
If the GSIB winds up not being able to pay the loans back, then the shortfall must
be met by a special levy on other SIFIs. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o) (2012). The availabil-
ity of such a lending source is extremely important, as failure to meet obligations
as they come due, or the mere fear that they will not be met—or, indeed, the fear
that others may fear they will not be met—can spark the very run-like behavior
special bankruptcy and resolution procedures are designed to prevent. See, e.g.,
Michael S. Barr, Eliminating OLA Is Careless and Shortsighted, AMER. BANKER
(May 11, 2017, 12:46 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/eliminating-
ola-is-careless-and-shortsighted [https://perma.unl.edu/8JHP-6BJJ] (emphasiz-
ing the importance of OLA’s “FDIC-provided liquidity in a crisis through the
Treasury Department’s ‘orderly liquidity fund,’ which is backed by the firm’s as-
sets, when private-sector lenders are likely to balk. Without that, resolution is a
fool’s errand and likely to spark widespread panic.”). It is worth contrasting SIFI
failure with a typical bankruptcy, in which funding for ongoing operations pro-
vided by private lenders is routine; such arrangements are called debtor-in-pos-
session, or “DIP,” financings. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). Such private lending is
facilitated by bankruptcy courts’ authority to give DIP lenders priority over most
pre-bankruptcy claims. Id. § 364(c)(1). Under CHOICE Act 2.0, however, private
lenders to the recapitalized GSIB would not automatically receive such protec-
tions because the loans would likely not be made to the legacy holding company,
which is the entity in bankruptcy, but rather to the new bridge holding company,
which is not in bankruptcy. (The new bridge holding company is where all the
operational subsidiaries—those that are likely to face liquidity squeezes—would
be housed.) More importantly, it is extremely unlikely that private lenders will
have the resources to prevent a full-fledged run. The largest private DIP financ-
ing to date was approximately $9 billion. See Billy Cheung, Energy Future Hold-
ings Lining up $9 Billion Bankruptcy Financing, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2014,), http:/
/www.reuters.com/article/us-energy-future-hd-loans/energy-future-holdings-lin
ing-up-9-billion-bankruptcy-financing-idUSBREA2Q13020140327 [https://
perma.unl.edu/CL6Q-RHFB] (explaining that the $9 billion DIP financing was
“eclipsed only by General Motors $33 billion DIP loan,” which was extended not
by private parties, but by the U.S. Treasury under special authorization from
Congress). To put this in perspective, JP Morgan had over a quarter-trillion dol-
lars in non-deposit short-term liabilities at the end of 2016. JPMorgan Chase &
Co., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended Dec. 31, 2016, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
296 (2016), [https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961717
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filing,176 and (for some firms) the difficulty of pre-planning a bank-
ruptcy.177 Foremost among the latter reasons—those that are likely
intractable within a bankruptcy context—is the extreme difficulty of
international coordination outside a resolution process managed by
regulators.178 As Jeff Gordon and Mark Roe have argued:
A U.S. bankruptcy court will lack deep prior relationships or the authority to
reach understandings with foreign regulators in advance of a bankruptcy fil-
ing. This increases the likelihood that foreign regulators or foreign courts, at
the behest of local interests, will seize assets within their jurisdiction. For a
global SIFI, such seizures are likely to be the death-knell of a successful
bankruptcy.179
In short, the abolition of OLA—particularly when the “replacement” is
so flawed—will significantly increase the risk of catastrophic conta-
gion resulting from triggering a GSIB resolution.
The problem here may play itself out through a disruptive bank-
ruptcy filing similar to the Lehman Brothers’. An equally plausible
path, however, is that regulators will do everything they can to pre-
vent a SIFI from being put into resolution. In other words, regulators’
readiness to pull the trigger requires some degree of confidence that
the process has a good chance of working. Repealing the OLA would
undermine this confidence and have a significant negative impact on
efforts to counteract regulators’ bias towards delay.
000314/corp10k2016.htm] [https://perma.unl.edu/J8HZ-WJ34] (providing year-
end balances for “federal funds purchased and securities loaned or sold under
repurchase agreements,” “commercial paper,” and “other borrowed funds”).
176. See Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy for Banks: A Sound Concept
That Needs Fine-Tuning, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.ny
times.com/2016/08/17/business/dealbook/bankruptcy-for-banks-a-sound-concept-
that-needs-fine-tuning.html (“If the regulators think that a bankruptcy is
needed, but that a bailout or alternative resolution process is not needed, they
cannot directly force a filing. . . . True, regulators can pressure bank managers to
reluctantly file, but the regulators may have to concede conditions to bank execu-
tives to make them file quickly; if the bank does not file quickly, the regulators
may decide that to save the economy, they have to bail the bank out. In the ex-
treme case, bank management may just refuse to file for bankruptcy.”).
177. See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe to Senator Michael Crapo
et al., Financial Scholars Oppose Eliminating “Orderly Liquidation Authority” as
Crisis-Avoidance Restructuring Backstop (May 23, 2017), http://blogs.harvard.
edu/bankruptcyroundtable/files/2017/05/Scholars-Letter-on-OLA-final-for-Con
gress-1.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/8KFB-29JK] (arguing that bankruptcy would
only be plausible for a systemically important financial institution if it had en-
gaged in the living will process, but that the CHOICE Act 2.0 would eliminate
regulatory authority to subject non-bank SIFIs to this planning process).
178. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 175 (citing the importance to a non-disruptive process
of “global coordination with foreign regulators, based not only on prenegotiated
legal memorandums of understanding, but also on collaborative war-gaming,
communications and, most important, the development of a trusted relationship
between the FDIC and other overseas regulators earned over time”).
179. Gordon & Roe, supra note 177, at 3.
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c. Capital Shortcomings
As mentioned above, a potentially significant cause of delay in trig-
gering resolution arises from the shortcomings of regulatory capital as
a timely measure of solvency. Recall that capital is a measure of the
value of a bank’s assets minus its liabilities.180 (Capital regulations
apply on a consolidated basis to BHCs, as well as to banks. In this
section, for ease of explication, “bank” should be read to refer to both
depositories and BHCs.) A bank’s assets do not consist primarily of
land, factories, inventory, or intellectual property, but rather of
promises by people, firms, and governments to pay the bank money in
the future.181 Of course, those promises may be broken and borrowers
may default.182 How, then, do we value these assets? For some assets
there is an established market price, but many bank assets do not
trade in active secondary markets. For these less liquid assets, the
details of valuation can be complex,183 but are conceptually simple: we
make an educated guess. As financial journalist and former invest-
ment banker Matt Levine has put it,
A bank is a collection of contracts that provide for future cash flows, and the
value of those contracts depends on your guesses about the future cash flows.
[Accounting] rules give you some guidance about how to guess—with different
[accounting] rules providing different guidance for different purposes—and
then you get some smart people to make the best possible guess. A bank’s
income statement—and balance sheet—is just a set of social conventions
about predicting the future.184
Because valuing banks’ assets involves making educated guesses
about future repayments and interest rates,185 it is possible that a
sudden shift in expectations can cause a swift, significant change in
the valuation of assets. And because capital represents the difference
180. See supra section II.B.
181. When a bank makes a loan, it represents a liability for the borrower but an asset
for the bank—it represents the contractual right to future cash flow from the
borrower. Bank assets consist overwhelmingly of cash and senior debt claims.
See, e.g., CARNELL ET AL., supra note 31, at 105–06 (providing aggregate statistics
on holdings of FDIC-insured institutions).
182. Default risk is credit risk, but as the S&L crisis illustrates, banks may also face
other types of risk, such as interest rate risk. See supra subsection III.B.1.ii.
183. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SUPERVISORY POLICY AND
GUIDANCE TOPICS: ALLOWANCE FOR LOAN AND LEASE LOSSES (ALLL), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/alll.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/
ET4L-PLES] [hereinafter ALLL GUIDANCE] (providing links to policy letters and
the relevant provisions of the Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual and
the Commercial Bank Examination Manual dealing with loan loss accounting).
184. Matt Levine, Bank of America Made $168 Million Last Quarter, More or Less,
BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014
-10-15/bank-of-america-made-168-million-last-quarter-more-or-less [https://
perma.unl.edu/X4RT-YUYV].
185. On the effect of market interest rates on the value of debt claims, see Crawford,
supra note 134, at 193–94.
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between the value of a bank’s assets and its liabilities, such a shift
would also mean a sudden change in the capital position of the
bank.186
It turns out, however, that regulatory measures of market values
often lag behind the market in accounting for such shifts. For exam-
ple, when market actors expect a higher percentage of defaults on a
bank’s loans, that does not necessarily mean that the bank will in-
crease its accounting-based provisions for expected defaults or losses
in a timely manner.187 Thus, regulatory measures of capital are infa-
mous as “lagging indicators” of trouble at banks; that is, there is often
a significant lag between trouble materializing with respect to a
bank’s assets (or the market’s recognition of such trouble) and the re-
flection of that trouble in the bank’s regulatory accounting mea-
sures.188 This problem was particularly salient during the financial
crisis.189 Darrell Duffie has observed that Citigroup (which arguably
received more government support than any other institution during
the crisis190)
186. It is worth noting that there are different categories of capital: common equity;
Tier 1 (which encompasses common equity, perpetual noncumulative preferred
shares, and a few other “rarefied” equity instruments); and Tier 2 (which includes
various types of long-term debt). CARNELL ET AL., supra note 31, at 223–25. Tier 2
counts as capital because it is a more stable form of funding than, for example,
deposits, as claimants can withdraw their principal on demand. But the defini-
tion of capital as assets less liabilities applies most squarely to common equity
and Tier 1 capital.
187. See generally ALLL GUIDANCE, supra note 183 (providing guidance on accounting
for loan losses).
188. One way to think about this is that markets update their expectations about fu-
ture borrower defaults (and interest rate moves) more frequently than banks do.
189. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, PRINCIPLES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. AND INTERNA-
TIONAL REGULATORY CAPITAL FRAMEWORK FOR BANKING FIRMS 6 (2009), https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/capital-state-
ment_090309.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/F8P8-A7E6] (“Many of the firms that
failed or required extraordinary government assistance during the recent crisis
were well capitalized under existing regulatory capital standards. This highlights
how the existing regulatory capital and accounting rules generate capital ratios
for banking firms that too often are a lagging indicator of financial distress. For
example, the existing capital rules generally provide that a banking firm’s capital
does not reflect unrealized gains or losses on available-for-sale securities. These
and other similar features of the capital framework reduce the credibility of regu-
latory capital ratios for market participants and reduce the usefulness of such
ratios for supervisors.”).
190. In a 2014 speech, Senator Elizabeth Warren observed that “[d]uring the financial
crisis, when all the support through TARP and from the FDIC and Fed is added
up, Citi received nearly half a trillion dollars in bailouts . . . . That’s almost $140
billion more than the next biggest bank got.” ‘Enough is Enough’: Elizabeth War-
ren Launches Fiery Attack After Congress Weakens Wall Street Regs, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2014/12/12/enough-is-enough-elizabeth-warrens-fiery-attack-comes-after-con
gress-weakens-wall-street-regulations/ [https://perma.unl.edu/TS8Q-TD7U] (pro-
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had a Tier-1 capital ratio that never fell below 7% during the course of the
financial crisis, and was measured at 11.8% at roughly its weakest moment in
December 2008, when the stock-market capitalization of [Citigroup’s] holding
company fell to around $20 billion [ ], or about 1% of its total accounting as-
sets. Because of the limited-liability treatment of equity and because of signif-
icant prevailing uncertainty over the true valuation of [Citigroup’s] assets,
this stock-market valuation suggests that [Citigroup’s] assets probably had a
market value well below its debt principal in late 2008.191
The problem was not unique to Citigroup. Bank of England execu-
tive director Andrew Haldane has captured the breadth and depth of
the problem by comparing regulatory measures of capital for “crisis”
and “no crisis” banks leading up to and during the crisis.192
(Haldane’s groupings include not just banks as we have defined them,
but various types of financial institutions—banks, BHCs, and govern-
ment-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae—in the United States
and abroad.)193 The “crisis” and “no crisis” categories are determined
based on whether a bank failed or likely would have failed absent sig-
viding the text of Senator Warren’s speech). It is worth noting, however, that the
government did not ultimately suffer any direct losses from its interventions in
support of Citigroup. To wit, roughly half of the “nearly half a trillion dollars” in
support came in the form of an agreement by the government to share (the major-
ity of the) losses on a $301 billion asset pool held by Citigroup. See FINANCIAL
CRISIS MANUAL, supra note 2, at 78–79 (explaining that the agreement would
force Citigroup to absorb the first $39.5 billion in losses, after which the govern-
ment would absorb ninety percent of any losses). The agreement was terminated
with no losses to the government. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Prices




December 2009, the loss-sharing arrangement was terminated at the request of
Citigroup. Because neither Treasury, nor the FDIC, nor the Federal Reserve was
ever required to make any payment under the arrangement, and they have had
no obligation to do so since December 2009, all income received through the pro-
gram constitutes a net gain to the taxpayer.”). The government also profited
(though likely did not get an appropriate risk-adjusted return) from its direct
capital injections into Citigroup. See David Lawder, U.S. Exits Citigroup Stake
and Earns $12 Billion Profit, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-citigroup-treasury-offering/u-s-exits-citigroup-stake-and-earns-12-bil-
lion-profit-idUSTRE6B55KP20101207 [https://perma.unl.edu/28PA-29F5].
191. Darrell Duffie, Contractual Methods for Out-of-Court Restructuring of Systemi-
cally Important Financial Institutions (Stanford Univ. Working Grp. On Econ.
Pol’y, Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.darrellduffie.com/uploads/policy/DuffieRestruc-
turingOutOfCourt2009.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/KLQ3-WP29]. (Duffie refers to
“Citibank” rather than Citigroup, but his observations are apropos of Citigroup,
the holding company, on a consolidated basis, rather than just Citibank, its com-
mercial banking subsidiary.).
192. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Bank of Eng., Remarks at the American Eco-
nomic Association: Capital Discipline 14 (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.bis.org/review
/r110325a.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/G7GP-ALB2].
193. Id.
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nificant government support in the fall of 2008.194 Chart 1, below, pro-
vides a comparison of the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratios195 for the
two groups of banks from mid-2002 through late 2008.
Chart 1: Tier 1 Capital Ratios for “Crisis” and “No Crisis” Banks196
As the chart illustrates, regulatory capital was actually higher at
the “crisis” banks than the “no crisis” banks from roughly mid-2006
194. Haldane explains,
[“Crisis” banks] are a set of major financial institutions which in Au-
tumn 2008 either failed, required government capital or were taken over
in distressed circumstances. These are RBS, HBOS, Lloyds TSB, Brad-
ford & Bingley, Alliance & Leicester, Citigroup, Washington Mutual,
Wachovia, Merrill Lynch, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs,
ING Group, Dexia and Commerzbank.
Id. at 14. “No crisis” banks in his estimation include “HSBC, Barclays, Wells
Fargo, JP Morgan, Santander, BNP Paribas, DeutscheBank, Cre´dit Agricole, So-
cie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, BBVA, Banco Popular, Banco Sabadell, Unicredit, Banca Popolare
diMilano, Royal Bank of Canada, National Australia Bank, Commonwealth Bank
of Australia and ANZ Banking Group.” Id.
195. Tier 1 capital encompasses common equity, perpetual noncumulative preferred
equity, and a handful of other instruments. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 31, at
223–25.
196. Haldane, supra note 192.
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through the height of the crisis in Autumn 2008, and indeed shot up in
mid-2008, so that the troubled banks looked healthiest at the very mo-
ment they either failed or required significant assistance to survive.
In Part IV, below, I explore approaches to mitigating the problems
with respect to accuracy and timeliness posed by capital qua resolu-
tion trigger. While there is significant room for improvement, it is nev-
ertheless worth emphasizing that perfection is likely not attainable on
this front. For instance, while the mismatch between market and reg-
ulatory measures of solvency were stark leading up to the crisis, it
also true that the risk of a correlated downturn in home prices was
neglected in the mid-2000s,197 and that most losses arose from lend-
ing that occurred before the market had fully awakened to the risks.
Loans based on shoddy underwriting and faulty assumptions had al-
ready been made, and there was little that even the most diligent reg-
ulators could have done at that point to avoid steep losses.198
IV. THE PATH AHEAD
This Part explores appropriate responses to the gaps and obstacles
described in Part III and proposes several other ways to bolster the
resolution triggering process. Responses to the problems regarding the
(mis)use of liquidity as a trigger are considered here in section IV.A.
The implications of problems of capital and timeliness—slightly less
straightforward—are explored in section IV.B. Establishing a credible
197. See, e.g., Joshua Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3, 20 (2009) (“In March 2007, First Pacific Advisors discovered that Fitch
used a model that assumed constantly appreciating home prices, ignoring the
possibility that they could fall.”). On the problem of neglected risks and their role
in financial crises, see Nicola Gennaioli, Neglected Risks: The Psychology of Fi-
nancial Crises, 105 AMER. ECON. REV. 310 (2015) (presenting “a psychological the-
ory of the neglect of risk and financial crises”).
198. It is worth noting that financial firms were paying significant dividends to share-
holders, eroding their capital base, even as they were bleeding losses in 2007 and
2008. See, e.g., ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 115, at 174–75. At the time, regu-
lators lacked effective tools to prevent this, even if they had wanted to do so. Post-
crisis, regulators have several tools to prevent large bank holding companies, at
least, from engaging in capital distributions at moments when they should be
shoring up their capital position. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 31, at 239
(describing the post-crisis requirement of a “capital conservation buffer,” above
and beyond capital adequacy requirements, and the attendant restrictions on
capital distributions for firms whose buffers are too small); see also BD. OF GOVER-
NORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 2017: SUPERVI-
SORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS (2017), https://www.federalre
serve.gov/publications/files/2017-dfast-methodology-results-20170622.pdf [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/ZXF6-635M] (describing stress tests and the comprehensive capi-
tal analysis and review applied to the largest BHCs on an annual basis, and not-
ing that “[i]f the Federal Reserve objects to a firm’s capital plan, the firm may
only make capital distributions that the Federal Reserve has not objected to in
writing”).
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and effective framework for triggering resolution in a timely fashion
based on capital—or more precisely, on actual or imminent insol-
vency—is difficult. Section IV.B considers past experience with this
precise problem in the context of traditional bank resolutions, along
with various proposals for optimizing the triggering process that have
arisen in three areas: bank resolution, “contingent convertible bond”
design, and SIFI resolution. I conclude that a set of rules proposed
pursuant to Dodd Frank Section 166 but never finalized provides a
good blueprint for establishing an optimal triggering framework. In
section IV.C, I consider the possibility that timeliness issues will per-
sist even after the steps proposed in section IV.B are implemented and
suggest an increase in the long-term debt component of TLAC as a
possible mitigant; if delay creates the risk of ballooning losses, then
increasing the loss-absorbing debt that GSIBs are required to issue is
a way to help prevent these losses from forcing regulators into another
bailout-or-panic dilemma. Finally, in section IV.D, I address the ques-
tion of how much discretion should rest with regulators once trigger-
ing guidelines have been established.
A. Bolstering the Public Liquidity Backstop
The policy prescriptions that flow from the problems described in
section III.A, above, appear relatively straightforward. First, liquidity
should not be used as a triggering metric for resolution or bankruptcy
(though it may make sense to use it as a trigger for heightened super-
visory attention). Second, to the degree the current GSIB configura-
tion persists,199 emergency lending authorities should be bolstered
rather than restricted. Specifically, the restrictions Dodd-Frank
placed on the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authorities should
be rolled back.200 Stronger emergency lending authorities would facil-
itate regulators’ ability to prevent vicious knock-on effects that might
arise from a run on a solvent financial institution. The typical objec-
tion to strengthened emergency lending authorities is that it will fos-
ter moral hazard.201 If moral hazard is a concern, however, the
appropriate response is not to eliminate emergency lending but rather
199. See supra note 66.
200. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 343(3)(A), (B)(i) (2012); see, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL,
supra note 2, at 18–40.
201. See, e.g., MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE:
EMERGENCY LANDING 17 (2016) (“One broader economic concern with [the Fed’s
emergency lending authority] raised by House Financial Services Committee
Chairman Jeb Hensarling is that ‘its use risks exacerbating moral hazard costs.’
Moral hazard is the concept that firms will take greater risks if they are pro-
tected from negative outcomes. In this case, moral hazard occurs because firms
are more likely to be more reliant on short-term lending if they anticipate access
to Fed lending during a liquidity crisis.” (internal citation omitted)).
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to marry it to heightened risk constraints, including capital and activ-
ity constraints.202
B. Promoting Timeliness
This section explores ways to counteract regulators’ bias towards
delay and the problem of timeliness and capital.
1. Background: Prompt Corrective Action
The S&L crisis, as noted, was severely exacerbated by regulators’
unwillingness to pull the plug on weak and insolvent S&Ls.203 After
the S&L crisis, Congress tried to address the problem of regulatory
bias toward delay with the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which cre-
ated a “prompt corrective action” (PCA) regime, obliging banks and
regulators to take certain prescribed steps when capital fell below pre-
determined levels.204 There are several possible levels of “early
remediation” prior to resolution;205 and when a bank’s “tangible eq-
uity ratio”206 falls below two percent, there is a presumption that reg-
202. See generally John Crawford, Lesson Unlearned?: Regulatory Reform and Finan-
cial Stability in the Trump Administration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 127
(2017) (arguing that shadow banks create the same risks as banks; that these
risks are not susceptible to market solutions; and that the regulatory paradigm
that applies to banks should be extended to shadow banks); see also GEITHNER,
supra note 4, at 430 (comparing the denial to regulators of absence fighting to
taking fire-fighting equipment away from the fire department: it “ensures that
the equipment won’t be used, but isn’t much of a strategy for reducing fire
damage”).
203. See supra subsection III.B.1.ii.
204. The heart of the prompt corrective action regime is the creation of different capi-
tal-based categories, with different regulatory consequences for banks depending
on which category they fall in. The categories are “well capitalized,” “adequately
capitalized,” “undercapitalized,” “significantly undercapitalized,” and “critically
undercapitalized”; and bank regulators are required to specify by regulation “for
each relevant capital measure the levels at which an insured depository institu-
tion” meets such measure. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1), (c)(2) (2012). The centerpiece
of early remediation is a “capital restoration plan” that regulators deem credible;
other restrictions may include, depending on the level of remediation, restrictions
on expansion and acquisitions; removal of the bank’s officers and directors; and a
requirement that the bank’s parent company provide a guarantee of its capital
restoration plan (stepping in to fill the gap if the bank fails to do so). 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1831o(e)(2), (e)(2)(C)(1), e(2)(C)(ii), f(2).
205. Id.
206. The tangible equity ratio is defined as “tier 1 capital PLUS cumulative preferred
stock and related surplus LESS intangibles except qualifying purchase mortgage
servicing rights (PMSR) divided by total assets LESS intangibles except qualify-
ing PMSR.” COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BC-268, BANKING CIRCULAR:
PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION 2 (1993). On tier 1 capital, see CARNELL ET AL., supra
note 31, at 223–25.
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ulators will place it in resolution.207 The goal of this regime is to
override the type of bias towards delay that regulators exhibited dur-
ing the S&L crisis.
While the locus of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 was shadow
banks rather than banks,208 depositories also came under significant
stress.209 In 2011, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a re-
port analyzing the efficacy of PCA during the crisis and its after-
math.210 The GAO found that “of the 569 banks that fell into the
undercapitalized or lower capital categories of PCA [between 2006 and
2010], 270 failed.”211 Although a “principal goal of PCA is to prevent
losses to the [deposit insurance fund] for the vast majority of bank
failures,” every single one of these 270 failed banks caused losses to
the deposit insurance fund.212 The median level of losses taken as a
percentage of bank assets was a staggering 27.7%, meaning that many
of the banks were deeply insolvent by the time they were finally put
into resolution.213
The magnitude of the losses from these banks—despite the stric-
tures of the PCA regime—suggest a difficulty beyond regulatory in-
centives: namely, the timeliness and accuracy of solvency measures.
Even if regulatory incentives are perfectly aligned with the public
good, they can only be as good as the metrics that inform their deci-
sions, and capital poses some serious difficulties on this front.
2. Establishing Clear Guidelines and Addressing Capital’s
Shortcomings
Even as capital—or, more generally, balance sheet (in)solvency—is
retained as the appropriate metric for triggering resolution, it might
be possible either to improve the way it is measured or to heighten the
level at which it triggers resolution. In this section, I consider various
proposals to effect such changes, developed in three different contexts:
as part of proposals for improving PCA for banks, as part of the design
207. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(h); FDIC, RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLI-
CIES 2.1-8 (2015), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section2-1.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/2HQG-BU4S] (providing current threshold for the cate-
gory “critically undercapitalized”).
208. See generally RICKS, supra note 26.
209. See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 365–71 (describing runs on Washington
Mutual and Wachovia). A number of smaller banks failed in the aftermath of the
crisis. Id. at 401 (“Between January 2009 and December 2010, 297 banks . . .
failed; most were small and medium-sized banks.”).
210. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-612, BANK REGULATION: MODIFIED
PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION FRAMEWORK WOULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS (2011)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
211. Id. at 17. During this period, twenty-five banks failed without having gone
through PCA remediation beforehand. Id.
212. Id. at 9, 17.
213. Id. at 19–20.
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of “contingent convertible” bonds, and as part of a Dodd-Frank-man-
dated early remediation regime for GSIBs that has been proposed but
not finalized.
First, in its report on the failings of the prompt corrective action
regime in the aftermath of the crisis, the GAO considered proposals
for improving the PCA’s triggering criteria.214 The proposed new
methods boiled down to (i) raising the capital trigger levels and
(ii) adding an additional trigger or triggers.215 The option of a differ-
ent trigger “would require regulators to monitor other aspects of a
bank’s performance, such as asset concentration, asset quality, or li-
quidity, and if problems were identified, to take increasingly severe
actions to address problems in that area.”216 I believe both approaches
make a great deal of sense in the context of the pre-resolution phases
of PCA’s early remediation regime, where higher required capital ra-
tios and other metrics could trigger heightened supervisory attention
and tightened risk constraints on the bank. When it comes to trigger-
ing actual resolution, however, these approaches face greater obsta-
cles to efficacy. With respect to heightened capital, it is easy to
imagine that there would be political backlash against placing a GSIB
into resolution when its balance sheet measures imply that it is still
solvent and viable.217 (Nevertheless, the underlying point here—trig-
gering the process when it is likelier that there will be sufficient credi-
ble loss absorbing capacity in the capital structure—has much to
recommend it, as discussed in greater detail in section IV.C below.)
Other metrics, such as “asset quality,” are inappropriate as truly
independent triggers for resolution but may inform a more nuanced
picture of the actual capital position of the bank. For example, poor
asset quality (due, perhaps, to delinquency on loans owed to a finan-
cial institution) should only play a role in a decision to trigger resolu-
tion to the degree that it bears directly on the likelihood of imminent
insolvency—a likelihood that ideally should be captured directly by a
firm’s capital position.
A second area where trigger design has received a great deal of
attention is in the extensive literature on a loss-absorbing instrument
called the contingent convertible bond, or CoCo. CoCos are issued as
214. See supra notes 204–207 and accompanying text.
215. Id. at 35–43. The GAO designated three categories of proposed reforms: (1) “In-
corporat[ing] an institution’s risk profile into the PCA capital category thresh-
olds”; (2) “raise all PCA capital category thresholds”; and (3) “add an additional
PCA trigger.” Id. Category (1), however, may be seen as a variation on category
(3).
216. Id. at 40.
217. See Calomiris & Herring, supra note 85, at 41 (emphasizing that “delayed recog-
nition [of losses] is not only a technical challenge. Supervisors are subject to sub-
stantial political pressure, and that pressure often leads them to prefer to forbear
and ‘play for time’ . . . .”).
2018] RESOLUTION TRIGGERS 109
bonds, with regular interest and principal payments, but are designed
to absorb losses upon some contractually defined triggering event—for
example, by converting to equity or simply missing scheduled pay-
ments—without causing default or bankruptcy.218 CoCos have been
embraced by prudential regulators in Europe, but not in the United
States.219 Though U.S. regulators have not encouraged CoCo issu-
ance, there have been a number of proposals both in other jurisdic-
tions and in the United States on how best to design the instrument,
including how to trigger the CoCo’s loss-absorbing function.220
These proposals overwhelmingly recommend some version of a
market measure for triggering the CoCo conversion—a position in-
formed by the shortcomings of accounting measures of capital high-
lighted above.221 The proposals thus tend to retain the idea of balance
sheet solvency as the relevant triggering metric but would try to
achieve greater accuracy and timeliness by the use of market mea-
sures rather than regulatory accounting measures. As one illustration
of the potential for market measures to provide a (more) timely pic-
ture of a firm’s solvency, hearken back to Chart 1, which showed that
“crisis” banks looked healthier according to regulatory capital mea-
sures than “no-crisis” banks did leading up to and during the crisis.
Now consider Chart 2, below, which compares the same groups of
banks over the same time period based on a measure of the market’s
perception of the banks’ health—viz., the market value of each bank’s
equity relative to its asset base. Here, the picture is very different.
218. The long-term debt component of TLAC can be seen as, “in essence, a conversion-
to-equity CoCo triggered by a regulatory determination that the issuer is non-
viable and married to a resolution process—though this is an analytic rather
than a terminological point.” Crawford, supra note 78, at 151.
219. European bank regulators count CoCos as Tier 1 capital, but U.S. bank regula-
tors do not. See, e.g., Ciara Linnane, What Are CoCos, and Why Is Everyone
Freaking Out About Them?, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.mar
ketwatch.com/story/what-are-cocos-and-why-is-everyone-freaking-out-about-
them-2016-02-09 (CoCos “have become popular with European banks as they
work to meet more stringent regulatory requirements on bank capital in the
wake of the financial crisis. They are counted as Tier 1 contingent convertible
bonds, or additional Tier 1 capital.”); Erin McHugh, Understanding Contingent
Convertible Securities: A Primer 3, NERA ECON. CONSULTING (May 2016), http://
www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/Understanding_Contingent_
Convertible_Securities-A_Primer.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/A4BF-767S] (ex-
plaining that U.S. banks have not issued CoCos in part because “US regulators
do not currently allow CoCos to qualify as [Tier 1] capital”).
220. See Calomiris & Herring, supra note 85, at 44–46.
221. See supra subsection III.B.2.iii.
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Chart 2: Market Capitalization222 as a Percentage of the Book-
Value of Total Assets223
The graph suggests that markets understood that the “crisis”
banks were in significantly worse shape than the “no crisis” banks
leading up to and during the crisis.224 It is worth giving strong consid-
eration, therefore, to incorporating market measures of solvency into
the triggering process.
A third source for honing trigger design arises from work done pur-
suant to Section 166 of the Dodd Frank Act, under which the FDIC
and Federal Reserve must promulgate rules establishing require-
ments for early remediation at the largest BHCs.225 In 2012, the
FDIC and Federal Reserve proposed a set of rules that included the
222. Market capitalization is the product of the number of a firm’s outstanding shares
times the share price. Share price, of course, is a forward-looking measure based
on the market’s expectations of future cash flows. See, e.g., Market Capitalization
Defined, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/03/031703.
asp [https://perma.unl.edu/62K6-JTQE]. Regulatory capital, on the other hand, is
a historical accounting measure. Common equity, for example, is equal to the
funds a firm receives when it issued its shares (par value plus paid-in surplus)
plus net retained earnings. See, e.g., CARNELL ET AL., supra note 31, at 218.
223. Haldane, supra note 192.
224. For a theoretical perspective on why markets might do better than regulators at
this job, see Crawford, supra note 78, at 115–17.
225. 12 U.S.C. § 5366 (2012).
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early remediation requirements,226 but the parts of the rule touching
on these requirements were never finalized.227 The rule would have
created a system analogous to the PCA, with four remedial categories,
but for GSIBs rather than banks, and would have incorporated the
best GAO reform ideas.228 Specifically, the rule’s triggers for escalat-
ing remedial steps included liquidity, stress test failures,229 and defi-
ciencies in risk management, while resolution is triggered based on
falling below any one of three capital measures.230 Table 1, on the fol-
lowing page, lays out the triggers for each remedial level in the pro-
posed rule.231
226. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation for Covered Companies,
77 Fed. Reg. 594 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed Early Remedia-
tion Rule].
227. Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Bank-
ing Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 17240, 17264 n.73 (Mar. 27, 2014) [hereinafter
Final Rule on Enhanced Prudential Standards] (noting that the Board did not
adopt a final rule with respect to the early remediation requirements that had
been part of the proposed rule).
228. See supra notes 214–216 and accompanying text.
229. Stress tests are exercises carried out by the Federal Reserve pursuant to Dodd
Frank Act § 165 that simulate various economic scenarios, including “severely
adverse” conditions, and model the effect of these scenarios on the capital position
of large U.S. banking organizations. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2012). If a bank’s capital
is depleted too severely under the test simulations, the Federal Reserve may limit
or prevent the bank from making capital distributions (e.g., dividends) to its
shareholders. See, e.g., Ryan Tracy, What Are The Fed’s Stress Tests?, WALL ST. J.
(Jun. 22, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-are-the-feds-stress-tests-
1498123802 (“[Stress tests] are also important for investors in U.S. banks be-
cause if banks fail, they aren’t allowed to increase the amount of money they
return to shareholders through dividends or share buybacks.”).
230. Specifically, resolution would be triggered if the firm falls below three percent for
either its Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio or its Tier 1 leverage ratio; or if the firm
falls below six percent for its (total) risk-based capital ratio. Proposed Early
Remediation Rule, supra note 226, at 636. On Tier 1 capital, see CARNELL ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 223–25. The leverage ratio measures capital against total as-
sets; risk-based capital ratios measure capital against risk-weighted assets. See
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 31, at 225–32. Risk-weighted assets are computed by
multiplying asset values by prescribed risk-weightings—for example, Treasuries
have a risk weighting of 0, general obligation state bonds of 20%, and loans 90
days past due of 150%—and adding the products. Id.
231. Summary of the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rules for Enhanced Prudential Stan-
dards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies 28, Davis
Polk & Wardwell LLP (Dec. 23, 2011), https://www.davispolk.com/files/12.23.11_
summary_federal_reserve_proposed_rules.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/4FD8-
ERL2].
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Importantly, the rule would also incorporate a number of different
market measures as triggers for the first stage of remediation—a
stage requiring the Federal Reserve to “produce an internal report on
the elements evidencing deterioration within 30 days of [the] Level 1
trigger breach and determine whether the institution should be ele-
vated to a higher level of remediation.”232
These market measures would include both equity-based and debt-
based metrics,233 but would not (yet) be used to trigger resolution. In
the proposed rule, the reasons given for not using market-based mea-
sures as resolution triggers include (i) concerns about the measures’
validity—that is, the degree to which they may be over- and under-
inclusive in identifying firms for resolution—as well as (ii) the fact
that “market prices may adjust to reflect this use and potentially be-
come less revealing over time.”234
It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate these concerns in
depth with respect to any of the various metrics the Federal Reserve
lists in the proposed rule, but it is worth briefly fleshing them out a
bit. (I should note that I am cautiously optimistic that the concerns
can be adequately addressed.) Regarding the first point, validity (or
accuracy), it is worth distinguishing between debt- and equity-based
measures. Debt-based measures ideally capture the risk of insolvency
by providing a market-based estimate of the likelihood a firm will de-
fault on its debt obligations. If the market fears that default may occur
due to a liquidity crisis rather than fundamental (balance-sheet) insol-
vency, however, then debt-based metrics may provide a noisy signal of
a firm’s capital position.
This problem could potentially be addressed if (i) the Federal Re-
serve were given greater authority to provide emergency liquidity sup-
port to GSIBs,235 (ii) it established clear guidelines for doing so, and
(iii) the market developed confidence in these guidelines. Then, in the-
ory at least, market actors would not fear a solvent GSIB defaulting
due to a liquidity crisis. A second concern with debt-based measures is
likely to be the (il)liquidity of the markets.236 The accuracy and timeli-
232. Proposed Early Remediation Rule, supra note 226, at 636. The Federal Reserve
proposed six different market measures, four equity-based indicators and two
debt-based indicators. The equity-based indicators are expected default fre-
quency, marginal expected shortfall, market equity ratio, and option-implied vol-
atility. The debt-based indicators are credit default swaps and subordinated bond
spreads. Id. at 640.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See supra section IV.A.
236. With respect to bonds, Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales have observed,
[B]ond prices suffer from the problem of market segmentation and illi-
quidity. Bond issues differ along several dimensions: promised yield, ma-
turity, covenants, callability, and so on. As a result of this lack of
standardization, the market for each bond issue tends to be rather illiq-
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ness of market prices depends on the efficiency of the market, which in
turn depends (inter alia) on how liquid the market is.237 The price of
debt instruments may lag real-time economic developments due to
this relative illiquidity.
Equity-based measures, on the other hand, are more likely to de-
rive from highly liquid markets.238 There are two potential issues
with equity, however. First, if a bank has made risky investments
such that it has a relatively high likelihood of failure, but also a likeli-
hood of very high profits in the event the investments pay off, it may
support a relatively high share price.239 Thus, even a perfectly accu-
rate share price may be noisy with respect to the occurrence we care
about: failure. Second, it is theoretically possible for those who have
taken a short position240 on a firm to try to manipulate the share price
by launching a short-selling “attack” on the firm’s shares.241 As Dar-
rell Duffie has observed, “Markets need not be so efficient that bar-
gain-hunting buyers of shares would react quickly enough to offset the
downward price impact caused by sellers.”242 As Duffie also notes,
however,
Such a self-generating decline in share prices, sometimes called a ‘death spi-
ral,’ could be mitigated by a trigger that is based instead on a trailing average
share price—for example, the average closing price of the shares over the pre-
uid, with most bond issues trading only occasionally. This illiquidity
makes bond prices a less reliable indicator than credit default swap
prices.
Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial In-
stitutions, 13 AM. L. ECON. REV. 453, 478 (2011). While Hart and Zingales favor
credit default swap (CDS) prices, CDS are still likely to be significantly less liquid
than stock. See, e.g., Aline van Duyn, Study Highlights CDS Shortcomings, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/8c845ae4-d567-11df-8e86-
00144feabdc0 (reviewing a study that found even the most actively traded CDS
“change hands only a few times per day”).
237. See, e.g., Tarun Chordia et al., Liquidity and Market Efficiency, 87 J. FIN. ECON.
249 (2008) (finding evidence that greater market liquidity supports greater
efficiency).
238. Hart & Zingales, supra note 236, at 478 (“equity is very liquid”).
239. Id. Though highly liquid, equity “does not provide a good indicator of the
probability of default. Equity is insensitive on the downside (because of limited
liability) and very sensitive on the upside; thus, a small probability of a positive
event can sustain significant equity prices even in the presence of a high
probability of default.” Id.
240. If an investor has taken a “short” position on an asset, the investor makes money
if the asset loses value.
241. Short-selling involves “the sale of a security that is not owned by the seller or
that the seller has borrowed. Short selling is motivated by the belief that a secur-
ity’s price will decline, enabling it to be bought back at a lower price to make a
profit.” Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/short-
selling.asp [https://perma.unl.edu/XCA4-X5TS].
242. Darrell Duffie, A Contractual Approach to Restructuring Financial Institutions,
in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW THEM 109, 116 (Kenneth E. Scott
et al. eds., 2010).
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ceding 20 business days. In that case, any adverse price impact on a given day
would receive a weight of 1/20 toward the trailing average price used in the
conversion trigger.243
While a manipulator might be able to affect a share price over a very
short period, one can assume it would be much more difficult to do so
for any sustained period of time in public equity markets.
The second point—that “market prices may adjust to reflect [their
use as a trigger] and potentially become less revealing over time”—
reflects concern over what is commonly known as “Goodhart’s law,”
after British economist Charles Goodhart, which holds that “any ob-
served statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is
placed on it for control purposes.”244 Capital regulation arguably pro-
vides a good example of this: if we make a “dumb” leverage ratio245
the binding constraint on banks, then it “may encourage banks to in-
crease their risk per unit of assets, reducing [the leverage ratio’s] use-
fulness as an indicator of bank failure.”246 If, on the other hand, we
make risk-based capital requirements247 binding, then banks may
seek out assets that appear “safe” for regulatory purposes, but carry
hidden risk.248 In any event, it is not clear to me that Goodhart’s Law
would necessarily apply to many of the market-based measures the
Federal Reserve is considering, but attention to the issue is certainly
appropriate as regulators attempt to discern the most useful market
indicators of bank failure.249
243. Id.
244. Charles Goodhart, Problems in Monetary Management, The U.K. Experience, in
INFLATION, DEPRESSION, AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE WEST 111, 116 (Anthony
Kourakis ed., 1981).
245. The leverage limit sets capital requirements based on the total value of a bank’s
assets, irrespective of their riskiness. See, e.g., CARNELL ET AL., supra note 31, at
225.
246. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Bank of Eng., Speech at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Jackson Hole Conference: The Dog and the Frisbee
15 (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/8DWZ-HPCC].
247. Under risk-based capital requirements, the size of a bank’s required capital
buffer will vary depending on (a measure of) the riskiness of the bank’s assets. A
bank with a riskier portfolio of assets will thus be required to maintain a thicker
capital buffer than a bank with a “safe” portfolio of assets. See, e.g., CARNELL ET
AL., supra note 31, at 226–32.
248. This is a large part of the story of the financial crisis. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et
al., Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009,
4 FOUND. AND TRENDS IN FIN. 247, 273–91 (2010).
249. For a good analysis of when the “law” is likely to apply and when it is not, see
Noah Smith, Two Versions of Goodhart’s Law, NOAHPINION BLOG (Apr. 10, 2013),
http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/two-versions-of-goodharts-law.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/LDM2-EGG7] (distinguishing a “false” version of Good-
hart’s law—“[a]ny observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pres-
sure is placed upon it for control purposes”—from a “true” version—“[a]s soon as
the government attempts to regulate any particular set of financial assets, these
become unreliable as indicators of economic trends”).
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While the proposed rule would not use market indicators to trigger
anything but the first pre-resolution phase of early remediation, the
Federal Reserve specifically stated that it “expects to review this ap-
proach after gaining additional experience with the use of market
data in the supervisory process.”250 The rule further states, “Given
that the informational content and availability of market data will
change over time, the Board also proposes to publish for notice and
comment the market-based triggers and thresholds on an annual ba-
sis . . . .”251 This seems to be a reasonable approach, balancing the
potential promise of using market-based data with concerns about its
long-term validity.
Finalizing and implementing this rule would go a long way to al-
laying concerns about the bias toward delay in triggering resolution
under the OLA. The rule does two important things: it sets an (admit-
tedly imperfect) objective, capital-based standard for when regulators
should trigger resolution,252 and it opens the door to incorporating
market measures of (in)solvency into the resolution triggering process.
C. Right-sizing the Loss-Absorbing Buffer
Even with the early remediation rules in place, there is a good
chance that resolution will not be triggered until losses have eaten
through all the equity claims and then some. This reflects the diffi-
culty of overcoming all the challenges listed above: regulatory incen-
tives to delay, bank incentives to ramp up risk, and the shortcomings
of accounting measures, and perhaps even market indicators, to cap-
ture problems in real time.
While these challenges cannot be definitively solved, they can be
mitigated. If it is unrealistic to assume that any set of rules or guide-
lines can ensure the resolution trigger is pulled precisely when capital
falls to zero, the obvious solution is to ensure that plenty of other debt
can absorb losses without untoward consequences or contagion ef-
fects—precisely what the long-term debt component of TLAC issued
by the GSIB parent, as outlined above, is designed to do.253 The rule
requiring GSIBs to issue long-term debt as part of their TLAC has
been finalized;254 the relevant question, then, is whether the long-
term debt component of TLAC is sufficiently high. Posing this ques-
tion may help shed light on a critique leveled against the current re-
250. Proposed Early Remediation Rule, supra note 226, at 640.
251. Id.
252. The rules for triggering the orderly liquidation process lean heavily on discretion-
ary determinations by regulators regarding the likelihood of SIFI default and the
attendant systemic risks. 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a)–(b) (2012).
253. See supra section II.C.
254. See Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, 82 Fed. Reg. 8266 (2017).
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quirement that roughly one-third of TLAC be in the form of long-term
debt, as opposed to simply requiring more equity:
Why do it this way? One answer is . . . : You want to “ensure that there are
sufficient resources available in resolution.” The idea is that, if banks run out
of capital entirely—if they’re technically ‘insolvent’—then you can make them
solvent again by poofing TLAC debt into equity. If they have no TLAC debt,
only equity, then when they become insolvent you can’t do that. This strikes
me as an extreme bit of formalism—why not make the requirement all equity,
and seize the bank when it loses two-thirds of its equity?255
In one sense, the critique is correct: it would, in theory, work just
as well to eliminate long-term debt, force GSIBs to issue more equity,
and ask regulators to pull the plug on a GSIB—that is, put it into
resolution—if it falls below some relatively high capital threshold. An-
other way to understand the long-term debt requirement, however, is
as a mechanism to force regulators’ hands. Solvency is determined by
capacity to meet debt obligations; there are good reasons to think that
it would be more tempting for regulators to delay, and harder for them
to overcome various industry and political pressures,256 if they were
asked to trigger resolution when the GSIB is still (apparently) solvent.
Increasing the magnitude of the long-term debt requirement, in pro-
portional and/or absolute terms, might be understood as a way to en-
sure that regulators take the ultimate step—launching a resolution
process—when they can still legitimately avoid the bailout-or-panic
dilemma.
It is worth briefly addressing three further points regarding the
long-term debt requirement. First, even as a higher proportion of long-
term debt vis-a`-vis equity may ameliorate problems relating to trigger
timing, there is a trade-off: it may exacerbate incentives to gamble for
resurrection prior to resolution, as a thinner equity buffer makes
shareholders less sensitive to downside risks. On the other hand,
there are reasons to think that long-term debt may serve a discipli-
nary role more conducive to the goals of the prudential regulator than
equity does.257 This disciplinary role will probably not eliminate the
trade-off, but it should mitigate it.
Second, some have expressed concern that holders of long-term
debt will be tempting bailout beneficiaries for regulators.258 Unlike
255. Matt Levine, Regulators Want Banks to Rescue Themselves Next Time, BLOOM-
BERG: VIEW (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-11-11/
regulators-want-banks-to-rescue-themselves-next-time [https://perma.unl.edu/
5UUP-5GWE].
256. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
257. See generally Crawford, supra note 78.
258. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Earnings, Bailouts and Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Jul.
19, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-19/earnings-
bailouts-and-lawsuits [https://perma.unl.edu/BV6J-CGPG] (“If all that long-term
bank debt is in the hands of sympathetic retirees, the government may not be
excited about writing it down.”).
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short-term debt, however, the problem with imposing losses on long-
term debt is not structural, but rather one of fair advertising.259 This
is an entirely tractable problem: if long-term debt is marketed prop-
erly, one should feel just as comfortable imposing losses on such debt
as one does on bank equity.260
Third, some object that increasing TLAC requirements too much
will raise GSIBs’ cost of funding. Anat Admati and her colleagues
have compellingly critiqued these views in the context of equity capi-
tal: the cost of funding a firm should be independent of the funding
mix, absent real-world distortions,261 and the distortions in the con-
text of GSIBs reflect primarily subsidies diverting wealth from tax-
payers to the financial industry.262 From a social standpoint,
therefore, there are good reasons to think that increasing capital re-
quirements would not be expensive, as many on Wall Street imply,
and these reasons would apply to long-term debt as much as equity.
In any event, the key point is that an important response to the
problem of capital as a lagging indicator—and one that is already in
place at GSIBs, though perhaps not at an optimal level—is ensuring
that there is adequate non-systemically important debt that can ab-
sorb losses during the resolution process.
D. Regulatory Discretion
A final issue worth addressing is the question of how much discre-
tion regulators should retain in triggering resolution. This can be fur-
ther divided into two questions: (i) how much discretion should
regulators have to place a firm into resolution prior to its tripping the
capital deficiency wire, and (ii) how much discretion should regulators
have not to place a firm into resolution once it has tripped the capital
deficiency wire? On the first question, I believe regulators should re-
tain a good deal of discretion—even if, under normal circumstances,
we would not expect them to exercise it—because of the problems with
timeliness in using capital as a regulatory measure. On the second
question, there may be less at stake than first meets the eye since
259. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text; see Crawford, supra note 78, at
142–43 n.148.
260. ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT 125–26 (2014) (arguing that while depos-
its and deposit-like debt must be protected in a crisis, “[t]o prevent runs and pre-
serve the payment system, there is absolutely no reason for the government to
protect long-term creditors and shareholders of banks” (emphasis supplied)).
261. See Admati et al., supra note 40; see also Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller,
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM.
ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (proving that absent real-world frictions and transaction
costs, the value of a firm is independent of how it funds itself).
262. These include the tax preference for debt—interest payments are deductible but
dividends are not—as well as the implicit guarantee that many believe the gov-
ernment provides creditors of SIFIs. See Admati et al., supra note 40, at 20–24.
2018] RESOLUTION TRIGGERS 119
regulators who do not want to place a firm into resolution could bless
certain regulatory accounting tricks that make the firm look better
capitalized than it really is. (Again, the experience of the FSLIC and
S&Ls illustrates how hard it would be to prevent this.)263 This high-
lights again that there is no silver bullet for improving the triggering
framework. Even if regulators retain a certain degree of discretion,
however, creating a strong presumption that a firm should be placed
in resolution once its capital falls below a specified threshold would
create a marked improvement over the current, vague guidelines for
OLA.
V. CONCLUSION
The most important goal of financial reformers in the wake of the
crisis of 2008 was the elimination of the too-big-to-fail problem, and
the central challenge in achieving that goal was finding a way to let
systemically important firms fail without either bailing out creditors
with taxpayer money or risking contagious runs throughout the finan-
cial system. While the steps regulators have taken so far—in adopting
a single-point-of-entry strategy and in the TLAC rules—have brought
us much closer to credibly achieving the goal than many initially
thought possible, a key vulnerability in the current regulatory frame-
work remains the lack of effective guidelines for triggering the resolu-
tion process. This Article explores how such guidelines could be
established and how other features of the regulatory landscape that
would impede the effective implementation of such guidelines should
be addressed.
First and foremost, the early remediation rule proposed pursuant
to Dodd-Frank Section 166, which would lay out objective criteria for
triggering resolution, should be finalized and implemented. This
would include the cautious incorporation of market measures into the
remedial, and potentially into the resolution-triggering, process. Sec-
ond, the liquidity tripwire for bankruptcy in the GSIB living will
guidelines should be abolished, and regulators’ emergency lending
powers (to be paired with prudential oversight) should be bolstered.
Finally, if, after the other steps have been implemented, concerns
about timeliness linger, an increase in the long-term debt component
of the TLAC requirements should be explored.
We cannot rely on regulators to act of their own accord like heroes
in old Westerns who, brave but prudent, are never trigger-shy nor
trigger-happy. We can, however, design a system that maximizes the
likelihood that regulators will pull the trigger in a timely manner.
This Article provides a blueprint for such a design project.
263. See supra subsection III.B.1.ii.
